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Abstract: Hundreds of Constitutional revisions are proposed in our national legislature every 
year, yet only twenty-seven have been ratified as amendments in the 243-year history of the 
United States. The Constitution outlines the formal factors required to ratify an amendment, but 
this paper will focus on the informal factors that are integral to the eventual passage of a 
participatory amendment. Through case studies of the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments, this thesis examines the factors that contributed to the ratification of these 
amendments to find similarities in the circumstances that helped propel these bills to eventual 
adoption as amendments. Non-radical social movements, participation in war efforts, and 
backlash against radical protests emerge as some important factors conducive to the ratification 
of such amendments. Although not necessary or sufficient, these factors shed light on the 
ratification process and what it takes for a participatory amendment to be ratified.   
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Chapter 1: Where Amendments Originate  
Introduction 
 The founders of our country anticipated the need for change in the future and decided to 
include an amendment process to the United States Constitution. The formal process to ratify a 
constitutional amendment is rigorous in that it requires agreement amongst a vast majority of 
elected officials in both houses of Congress and state legislatures. Scores of proposed amendments 
pass through Congress every year with little to show as just twenty-seven amendments have been 
ratified to date, five of which are considered “participatory” amendments1. A “participatory” 
amendment in the context of this study refers to any federal constitutional amendment which 
expanded the electorate in national elections. In total there are five of these amendments: the 
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The 
objective of this paper is to understand why certain participatory amendments are ratified while 
other proposed amendments fail. Specifically, I examined the informal factors that are conducive 
to the ratification of two participatory amendments. I did this by way of the case study method. 
My cases are the Nineteenth and the Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which has allowed me to assess 
different factors which played a role in the ratification of these participatory amendments. In this 
thesis I will be examining the role of governmental institutions and social movements in the 
ratification of these two cases. Finding similarities in the factors leading to the approval of these 
amendments will add to the existing scholarship on the ratification of these specific amendments 
and help to understand the ratification process more generally.  
 
1 In the 115th Congress alone (2017-2018) there were a total of 71 proposed amendments to the Constitution 
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 My examination of these two participatory amendments provided insight as to which 
informal factors were especially conducive to the ratification of a participatory amendment. My 
findings emphasize certain factors that were especially important to the ratification of the two 
participatory amendments examined in this thesis. In the amendments examined here, both were 
demanded by subjugated groups long before ratification. Additionally, congressional records 
established that a sense of urgency existed amongst legislators to ratify these participatory 
amendments to try and stop radical protests. This thesis also finds evidence that ratification of 
these amendments was thanks in large part due to social movements which employed nonradical 
lobbying efforts on the grassroot level to petition at both the state and federal levels. The final 
important trend in the ratification of these amendments is how they both came at the tail end of 
large international wars during which the disenfranchised groups successfully embraced expanded 
societal roles. Congressional records demonstrated that these informal factors proved especially 
beneficial to the ratification of the participatory amendments examined in this thesis.    
This topic is of paramount importance because there are still American citizens, and 
citizens of American owned territories, who do not have the right to vote which makes future 
participatory amendments possible (Manza & Uggen, 2004). Groups such as the mentally ill, those 
in prison, people under the age of eighteen, residents of U.S. territories, and, in some states, people 
who have been convicted of a crime but are later released from prison after serving their time are 
all not allowed to vote. These people are currently disenfranchised but can conceivably be granted 
the right to vote by future participatory amendments. With this understanding I decided to conduct 
my study to find the factors that increase the likelihood that a participatory amendment is ratified. 
The factors and trends found here are by no means necessary or sufficient for the ratification of a 
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participatory amendment but are important to the process and can be used to help predict the 
success of future participatory amendments.  
Literature Review 
 At the founding of the United States the former colonists, and now Americans, formulated 
their Declaration of Independence which called for equality among men. Paradoxically, this 
equality did not apply to large portions of the American public, as they lacked various rights and 
freedoms, one of which being the right to vote. At the founding, the Constitution left most voting 
enfranchisement decisions to the states, who restricted the right to vote only to men who owned 
property and were at least twenty-one years old. Since then there have been hundreds of proposed 
amendments attempting to increase the electorate, but only a handful have been successfully 
ratified (Tansil, 1926).  
 One term that needs to be properly defined before examining the literature on this topic is 
that of a participatory amendment. In the context of this paper a participatory amendment refers to 
any amendment to the U.S. Constitution that expanded the electorate in federal elections. There 
are five participatory amendments under this definition: the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, 
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. All of these amendments provided previously 
disenfranchised groups of people the right to vote in national elections. By modifying the 
Constitution with these amendments Americans demonstrated their progression towards equality. 
 To understand the informal factors which affected the ratification of participatory 
amendments it is important to first understand the formal process for an amendment to the 
Constitution. There are two procedures to amend the Constitution and both processes were 
expected to be used equally at the founding (Natelson, 2011). Despite this expectation, only one 
of the two processes have ever been implemented. The common path for the ratification of an 
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amendment occurs when Congress proposes a potential amendment that must be approved by a 
minimum of two-thirds of each house. After being approved by Congress, the proposed 
amendment must then be passed by three quarters of state legislatures. Once ratified, the proposed 
amendment is added to the Constitution as law.  
 There is a second path to ratification that a bill can take, which was added to the 
Constitution at the urging of Anti-Federalists. This route was added in fear of Congress potentially 
abusing its power and not adopting a beneficial amendment for personal gain, such as one that 
would limit Congress’s power (Natelson, 2011). This second path to ratification, outlined in 
Article V of the Constitution, explains that when two-thirds of states vote to form a national 
convention to discuss constitutional amendments Congress must call for the formation of such a 
meeting. This convention can propose as many amendments as needed before sending them to the 
states where three-fourths of state legislators must then approve the amendment(s). Because no 
amendment has been ratified by this specific process there are questions as to the logistics of such 
a convention that won’t be answered until this process is one day implemented (Rogers, 2007). 
 These procedures explain the formal process of amending the Constitution, but there exists 
a magnitude of informal factors that may affect if and when the process will prove successful. One 
crucial factor in determining the success of a given participatory amendment is the actions of social 
movements demanding suffrage. Other factors include federal considerations, such as the 
president’s support of an amendment, the actions of individual senators and representatives within 
Congress, and Supreme Court decisions. All these factors must be properly understood when 
attempting to understand why a proposed amendment passes or fails.  
 My examination of social movements was conducted through McAdams’ (1982), “political 
process model.” McAdams (1982) emphasizes the importance of three primary factors in the 
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creation and growth of social movements and adds a fourth factor that will also be important to 
understanding these developments. “Political opportunities” is the first of these factors and refers 
to a dramatic change in society that allows for the possibility of reform. “Indigenous organization 
strength” is the amount of internal resources and organizational structures available to movements. 
The strength of an organization is constantly changing as members and supporters waver, but for 
a social movement to succeed it must continuously become stronger and adapt throughout the 
process. The third factor is “cognitive liberation.” This refers to widespread recognition that the 
undesirable circumstances are not natural and can be changed. These are the three primary factors 
of the political process model; “all three conditions are essential, though not sufficient, to the 
process of legal mobilization” (McCann, 1994, p. 137). In addition to these, McAdams (1982) 
explains a fourth factor in this model which we will term “external response to insurgents.” This 
factor refers to how outside institutions and groups react to a specific social movement and is 
dependent on the strength of the insurgents and the degree that the movement helps or threatens 
these other groups. This final factor demonstrates that the actions and success of social movements 
depends not only on internal factors but also on external groups, which may have greater resources 
available than the typical social movement. McAdam’s political process model expects all the 
factors outlined above to work interdependently because they all must interact with one another to 
form a powerful social movement.  
 Not all scholars agree with the formulation of the political process model. One criticism 
provided by Morris (2000) argues that the model pays too much attention to external components, 
such as existing political structures, while largely discounting the well engrained social processes 
that create social movements. These engrained social processes consist of the “subjective” views 
of the political structures by insurgents and, it’s argued, that these perceptions are especially 
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important in bringing social movements together. Scholars also point to some parts of the model 
that they argue are loosely specified and must be precisely defined in order for the model to be 
truly comprehensive (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999; Morris, 2000; Polletta, 1999). One such example 
of this includes the lack of a consensus over the definition of “political opportunities” as it can 
include any and all factors that affect if people get together, but this definition is trivial as it can 
conceivably include anything and everything. Other scholars have decided to define “political 
opportunities” narrowly which causes this theory to become inadequate when explaining any given 
social movement. This lack of precision reflects the existence of countless political theorists who 
all define the political process a little differently (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). Despite these 
criticisms, the political process model is still viable and employed by scholars when attempting to 
understand the development and growth of social movements (McAdams, 1982; McCann, 1994; 
Pellow, 2001). I examined the development of the social movements calling for the ratification of 
the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments using the factors outlined by McAdams (1982). 
Using this model, I have highlighted how the movements are similar and differ in regard to the 
three primary factors McAdams (1982) emphasizes, while also considering external responses to 
these social movements. This allowed me to get a grasp as to why these specific social movements 
proved successful at creating institutional change when they did. 
 Other literature which examines the development and success of social movements also 
accounts for elite involvement within social movements. Elites bring political power, money, 
access to certain institutions, and other invaluable resources to social movements making their 
contributions important for success (Brown-Nagin, 2005). Understanding the significance of elites 
to social movements, and often times against them, is valuable but certainly not as important as 
the factors outlined by McAdams (1982). Scholarship on elites’ involvement within social 
WHAT DOES IT TAKE?  8 
 
 
 
movements has found them to play no more than a “supportive role” in the perpetuation of the 
movement; the factors found in the political process model have a much greater impact on the 
ability for movements to create substantial reforms (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986).  
 The ultimate goal of the social movements under consideration here was to amend the 
Constitution and expand the electorate, which could only be done by appealing to elected officials. 
Examining social movements as an informal factor is a must when attempting to understand these 
amendments, as scholarship has found direct links between social movements and the changing of 
legislator’s attitudes (Johnson, 2008; King, Cornwall, & Dahlin, 2005; Wouters & Walgrave, 
2017). Wouters & Walgrave’s (2017) experiment on elected officials and protests found that 
legislators are affected by protests put on by social movements, especially when they are large 
(numerically) and are unified internally. Researchers have examined other facets of social 
movements and how various factors affect lawmakers’ opinions. This research has consistently 
found that legislators are affected by social movements regardless of their predispositions to the 
political matter (Johnson, 2008; King, Cornwall, & Dahlin, 2005). Understanding that social 
movements affect the attitudes, decisions, and agenda setting of legislators is why I will be 
employing the political process model to understand the specific social movements relevant to the 
Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.  
 Social movements are just one informal factor that affects the chance that a participatory 
amendment will be ratified. The second informal factor that will be discussed in this thesis is that 
of governmental institutions which includes all three branches of the federal government. The first 
governmental institution we will discuss is that of presidential support. Presidents hold substantial 
power in setting the policy agenda within Congress due to their access to resources and political 
elites within Washington (Kernell, 1993). This power is reinforced by the president’s ability to 
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hold public events which can garner considerable support from the American public and is termed 
“going public” by Kernell (1993). This grants the president the ability to control policy discussions 
as congressmembers will avoid resisting the president’s proposed policy when public support is 
gained from “going public.” The ideas proposed by Kernell’s “going public” are highly contested 
as some scholars agree while others contest the President’s ability to change public opinions. 
Tulis’s (1987) conception of the “New Way” of presidential leadership demonstrates one scholar 
who agrees with Kernell’s theory. Tulis (1987) emphasizes a shift in presidential leadership from 
one directed at Congress and the courts to one targeting the general public. This shift is argued to 
have occurred under President Woodrow Wilson and has remained constant as all presidents since 
have had a “duty” to promote and defend policy initiatives to the public (Tulis, 1987).  
Understanding this uncovers the reason presidential support must be analyzed, as studies have 
revealed that the probability that a bill succeeds in Congress is positively related to the frequency 
with which a president publicly supports that bill (Barrett, 2004). This became especially evident 
to social movements and the general public during the start of the twentieth century under President 
Theodore Roosevelt, who vastly expanded the power of the president. Roosevelt began the 
transformation of the presidential office using the position as a “bully pulpit” (Lunardini & Knock, 
1980). This shift towards, what is termed, the “modern presidency” began under Roosevelt and 
granted the president increasing power to set the national agenda and speak out about certain 
issues. Using public appeals the president can potentially change the feelings of Americans leading 
to policy change and amendments, but it is also important to note that “going public” is not 
sufficient to cause legislative change (Edwards, 2009).   
 An alternative argument to “going public” argues that presidents react to the public and 
media when openly supporting legislation (Bodnick, 1990; Edwards III & Wood, 1999). Barrett 
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(2004) spends time debunking these arguments, but we cannot totally discount such criticisms of 
Kernell’s (1993) “going public” because causality has not been sufficiently proven. The issues 
with “going public” are based around the question of causality and arguments that say the president 
only supports bills that he/she knows will gather great support among the general population 
(Canes-Wrone, 2001). The ideas proposed by Kernell (1993) are further refuted by Edwards (2009)  
who emphasizes that presidential power does not consist of persuasion and instead, “presidents 
facilitate change by recognizing opportunities in their environments and fashioning strategies and 
tactics to exploit them” (Edwards, 2009, p. 188). Under this understanding American presidents 
do not cause change by “going public” (Kernell, 1993) with persuasive arguments but instead are 
given the opportunity to institute change when the political environment proves favorable for such 
revision. Scholarship is mixed when attempting to quantify the extent that a president’s public 
support of legislation affects the chances that a statute will be passed. Despite disagreement over 
exactly how much a president’s support of legislation affects its chances of ratification and where 
the prompt to offer the support comes from, the executive office appears to hold considerable 
power in setting the policy agenda, especially the domestic one (Barrett, 2004; Edwards III & 
Wood, 1999). 
 Another factor under the umbrella of governmental institutions is the support of individual 
congressmembers for each amendment. All bills in Congress have sponsors who introduce and 
support the proposed legislation. These men and women could potentially play an important role 
in attempting to pass the specific bill they introduce because they have “the strategic advantage of 
defining the contours of debate and affecting the general policy direction taken” (Frantzich, 1979, 
p.410). The power of sponsors is further emphasized by terming the original sponsor of a bill “the 
father” of that specific bill, as occurred with the Senator who sponsored the Twenty-Sixth 
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Amendment (Grossman, 2012). I also originally considered analyzing the roles of cosponsors of 
these amendments due to their support of the proposed amendments, but previous research has 
found cosponsors to have little effect on the outcome of bills (Wilson & Young, 1997). 
Congressional sponsors of proposed amendments are important insiders who can play an integral 
role in determining if an amendment manages to be ratified, making it critical to analyze their 
actions within Congress.  
 The final governmental institution this thesis will examine is the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
participatory accomplishments of both amendments studied here were first debated within the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court holds ample power as the foremost court of the United States 
and thus has a considerable effect on policy making, as Congressional bills must be constructed in 
a way that is deemed constitutional by the Court (Rice, 1982). This relationship is asserted to be 
inverted by Rosenberg (2008) who argues in support of, what he terms, a “constrained court” 
which claims that courts are not effective at producing major social change. This understanding of 
the Supreme Court’s lack of power is based around multiple factors including the Court’s inability 
to enforce their decisions as they instead rely upon the executive and legislative branches for 
implementation. The opposite of Rosenberg’s (2008) “constrained court” is, what he termed, the 
“dynamic court” which argues that the courts are effective in producing significant social reform 
because they lack electoral constraints the other branches of government must consider. Rosenberg 
is a firm believer in the “constrained court” view but other political science scholars argue that the 
court’s power in creating social change lies somewhere in the middle of Rosenberg’s dichotomous 
“constrained” and “dynamic” courts (McCann, 1994; Scheingold, 2004). We can see hints of a 
more “dynamic court” as the Supreme Court can overturn legislation that it finds unconstitutional, 
which grants it a role in the shaping of laws as Congress must construct bills to avoid court censure. 
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The Court can also impact legislators by forcing Congress to pass bills that reverse or modify court 
decisions (Stumpf, 1965). This was the basis of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, as the court ruled 
in Oregon v. Mitchell that a simple statute could not change the voting age in state and local 
elections (Fish, 2012). Congresspeople are thus forced to consider the rulings of the Supreme Court 
when constructing legislation and if they wish to circumvent the court, an amendment or 
congressional override is necessary (Barnes 2004; Rice, 1982). Congressional override can be 
exercised when court decisions are found to be errant and allows for the displeased group to revisit 
the issue in a location, like Congress, that may be more equipped to deal with the matter (Barnes, 
2004). Congress and the courts are in constant dialogue when formulating change and 
congressional overrides are just one way this dialogue can unfold. Constitutional amendments are 
more difficult to ratify than congressional overrides are to enact but have much more permanent 
places as law.    
 These are all the informal factors that I will analyze in the context of the Nineteenth and 
Twenty-Sixth Amendments. Previous research has demonstrated that social movements and 
governmental institutions both play a role in affecting legislators and the formation of bills and 
amendments. Although there is literature pertaining to each of these factors generally, there is a 
gap in the literature comparing these informal factors to one another and the power that each holds 
over the lawmaking process. Without a proven theoretical framework comparing the impact of 
each of these informal factors with one another I will not be able to determine the extent that each 
factor affected the ratification of these amendments. Instead, I will be examining these factors and 
comparing them across amendments to understand the commonalities and differences between the 
two. This will allow me to highlight important features in the passage of each of these two 
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amendments and to better understand the informal factors that affect the ratification of 
participatory amendments.  
Methods 
A mix of methodological approaches were used while conducting research for this paper 
to find the similarities and differences in the factors that contributed to the ratification of these two 
participatory amendments. I decided to study participatory amendments as there have been a 
sizable number of these bills which expanded the American electorate, and because future 
expansions to the electorate are possible due to some Americans, and citizens of American 
territories, lacking this crucial right (Manza & Uggen, 2004). While examining the existing 
participatory amendments I found that the most logical way to conduct research for this project 
would be by way of a case study. This approach provides an in-depth, understanding of each 
amendment and allows for informed comparisons of the two. 
While selecting my cases I decided to pick two of the five participatory amendments. These 
participatory amendments consist of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and 
Twenty-Sixth Amendments. I decided against studying the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
enfranchised men of color, due to its unusual post-Civil War, Reconstruction heritage, and its close 
connection to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (which would make untangling the three 
difficult). I also chose to not study the Twenty-Third Amendment, which gave citizens in the 
District of Columbia the right to vote in Presidential elections, because of its miniscule effects on 
citizens outside of Washington D.C. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which made poll taxes 
illegal, was also not included in my case selection due to its ratification being more about 
protecting Jim Crow laws in the South than actually enfranchising a group of people (Jenkins & 
Peck, 2013). The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was promoted and passed by Jim Crow proponents 
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who supported poll taxes but expected that the ratification of this amendment would set a precedent 
of needing a constitutional amendment to dismantle future Jim Crow legislation. This was 
understood to be more favorable by Southern Democrats, when compared to a simple 
congressional act to remove components of Jim Crow, because it is much more difficult to ratify 
an amendment than to pass a congressional statute. Unlike these three amendments, the Nineteenth 
and Twenty-Sixth Amendments enfranchised massive groups of people nationwide, without being 
ratified in conjunction with other amendments, and lacked any obvious ulterior motives. These 
two amendments allowed me to create a most similar case design because of their successful 
enfranchisement of large groups of disadvantaged people. Both cases were successful in their goals 
but also ratified under different temporal conditions which helped to gain an understanding of the 
informal factors leading to the passage of participatory amendments in general. This ultimately 
provided me with a “most similar” case design while also including elements of a “least similar” 
case design. Additionally, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was chosen as it can be differentiated 
from the Nineteenth Amendment due to its enfranchisement of a group that wasn’t permanently 
disenfranchised because they would gain the right to vote in a few years once they became of age 
(Shklar, 1991). Both amendments that I have studied were ratified in the twentieth century, in 1919 
and 1971 respectively. The movements associated with these amendments were well entrenched 
by the time of their ratifications, as the amendments had been debated and/or demanded for 
decades prior. This made compiling the information relevant to the ratification of each of the 
amendments complicated because factors leading to their ratification span decades.  
 This thesis was conducted by way of inductive research as I looked to compile data on the 
factors leading to the ratification of both these amendments and used this data to create a theory 
outlining the factors that are conducive to the ratification of a participatory amendment. Employing 
WHAT DOES IT TAKE?  15 
 
 
 
a qualitative method of study, I highlighted the factors which contributed to the ratification of each 
of these participatory amendments before examining both together to fully answer the question 
posed in this thesis. Most of the information gathered was found through non-numerical 
observations of historical documents. Throughout this study I also pay careful attention to 
understanding why these particular amendments were ratified when they were. Both of these 
amendments were demanded by different groups for decades before their implementation (Cultice, 
1992; McMahon, 2000; Offen,1999), so this thesis also considers why they were ratified when 
they were and not earlier or later.    
 To better understand the questions this thesis attempts to answer there are several themes 
that must be analyzed in the context of both participatory amendments. The first of these themes 
is the impact of mass social movements on the ratification of each amendment. To study the impact 
of social movements on the ratification of these amendments I examined several different sources 
of primary documents. First, I examined the mission statements, constitutions, meeting minutes, 
and other primary documents from the major social movements involved in advocating for each 
of these amendments. During this analysis I highlighted the motivations and tactics used by each 
group for pursuing legislative change. I then emphasized the ideas found in the primary documents 
I analyzed and looked for similarities across social movements, both within each amendment and 
across the two. This task was daunting due to the large number of social groups on both the national 
and state levels advocating for these amendments, especially the Nineteenth Amendment. Due to 
my inability to examine every social movement group in depth, I focused on the largest national 
groups, by number of members, to understand their impact on the ratification of these amendments. 
Specifically, regarding the Nineteenth Amendment, I examine the American Woman Suffrage 
Association (AWSA) and the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), which merged in 
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1890 to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). Regarding the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment I researched the Youth Franchise Coalition, which brought together 
numerous established organizations around the cause of youth enfranchisement. All these groups 
were large national organizations that helped pressure for their respective participatory 
amendments and must be examined to gain an understanding as to how social movements affected 
the ratification of these amendments.  
 As mentioned previously, my analysis of these social movements is largely in the context 
of McAdams’s (1982) political process model. I analyzed these movements by looking at the three 
primary factors that he explains in the model to understand how these social movements took hold 
and managed to pressure for the legislation they sought. I examined the start of these movements 
through their constitutions and founding members to understand what “political opportunities” 
occurred and allowed these groups to form and challenge their disenfranchisement. I also search 
for major political changes or cultural events that occurred around the time of the creation of these 
movements to understand this shift in “political opportunities.” Additionally, I accounted for elite 
support and any outside aid received by these movements from other groups or individuals that 
were important to establishing and strengthening the movements.  This examination fits under 
McAdams’s (1982) classification of “indigenous organization strength.” Finally, I examined the 
founding histories of each social movement to understand how and why they formed, reached 
“cognitive liberation,” and were able to aggressively push for enfranchisement. These three factors 
in the political process model help me to understand how each of these movements managed to 
form and grow to better understand what’s needed for social movements to successfully press for 
participatory amendments.  
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 Another important theme that has emerged from the literature in understanding the factors 
conducive to a participatory amendment being ratified is the support, or lack thereof, by the sitting 
presidents. In answering the question presented by this thesis, I examined how the sitting 
presidents reacted to the proposed amendments and demands from social movements. I chose to 
examine the presidents’ support of these bills due to their ability to easily pronounce ideas and 
opinions to a national audience. It remains an open question if the presidents’ positions and public 
support for these specific participatory amendments affected the chances of ratification. To help 
understand this, I highlighted the commonalities and any differences in the support provided by 
presidents for these amendments.    
 To compile information on presidents’ support of these participatory amendments I 
examined their position on each amendment, their speeches regarding the amendments both in and 
outside of Congress, and any meetings they had with social movement leaders or elites supporting 
the amendments. To gather these materials, I primarily used the University of California Santa 
Barbara’s American Presidency Project2. This database contains public presidential documents 
dating back to President George Washington and are all available and searchable in one single 
database. For each amendment I thoroughly searched by relevant president for key terms related 
to each amendment. It was of little use to search the database by the terms “Nineteenth 
Amendment” and “Twenty-Sixth Amendment” because I was searching for speeches and 
documents from prior to the ratification of these amendments. Instead I used search terms such as 
“women’s suffrage,” “social movement,” “enfranchisement,” and “right to vote” when finding 
documents related to the Nineteenth Amendment. For the Twenty-Sixth Amendment I used the 
 
2 Access to this database can be found with the following link: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
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following search terms: “youth enfranchisement,” “right to vote,” “lowering the voting age,” and 
“youth vote.”  
During my analysis of the presidents’ impacts on the Nineteenth Amendment I investigated 
the role that President Woodrow Wilson played on the eventual ratification of the amendment due 
to his considerable support for women’s suffrage during his second term (Amar, 2005; Lunardini 
& Knock, 1980). My analysis of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment focused on additional presidents 
that the literature revealed as having played an important role in its ratification. Specifically, I 
analyzed President Dwight Eisenhower, President Lyndon Johnson, and President Richard 
Nixon’s role in the ratification of the amendment as they all publicly supported lowering the voting 
age (Fish, 2012; Sarabyn, 2008).    
 The second factor that fits under the classification of governmental institutions is the 
support of individual Congress members. These individuals were examined to try and understand 
their actions within Congress and how they were able to gather support for the ratification of these 
amendments. I examined how these congressional leaders supported their respective participatory 
amendments to see if similar actions were taken within the contexts of each of the amendments 
studied in this thesis. To gain this information I primarily referenced congressional floor debates. 
Regarding the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, I also gave especial attention to my examination of 
Senator Jennings Randolph, who is termed the “father” of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment due to 
his sustained support for its ratification (Grossman, 2012). The Nineteenth Amendment, on the 
other hand, lacked a single major sponsor and instead was more of a people’s movement with 
much of the pressure for the bill coming from grass root mobilizations. Due to this I examined all 
of the debates surrounding the proposed amendment in depth and was able to find particular 
senators and representatives who were especially great advocates for youth suffrage.   
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 All of this information relating to congressmembers’ actions was uncovered from digitized 
congressional records. These records were found online through various databases and are quite 
plentiful; the hardest part of the process was finding the documents useful to this thesis amongst 
thousands of pages of records. To facilitate this, I used the government’s database “govinfo.gov,” 
which contains congressional records that are searchable by key terms and year. To find 
information about congressional actors I searched names, like Senator Jennings Randolph, in the 
database during the three years leading up to the eventual ratification of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment. I then searched the three years of congressional documents leading up to these two 
amendments with key terms such as “women/woman suffrage,” “youth suffrage,” and “right to 
vote”. This allowed me to find when the issues were being debated in the House and Senate. I then 
read the transcripts of the debates to understand what factors were being used to construct 
arguments both for and against the proposed amendments. These documents not only allowed me 
to discover how proponents of each amendment framed their support in Congress, but also gave 
me useful insight as to what factors were on the minds of Senators and Representatives at the time 
they debated these participatory amendments. I also specifically looked for references to the other 
informal factors I am studying in this paper, the use of extreme language, and any other themes 
that emerged as recurring in the framing of these issues by congressmembers. Understanding what 
the congresswomen and men were debating in the months approaching the ratification of these 
amendments gave valuable insight as to which factors examined in this thesis were especially 
salient in legislators’ minds. 
 The final crucial informal factor that fits under my governmental institution classification 
is the role of the Supreme Court in affecting the eventual ratification of these amendments. To 
study the role of the U.S. Supreme Court on the ratification of these amendments I have examined 
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the major cases and decisions pertaining to each respective participatory amendment. In doing this, 
I first explained the outcome of the cases and how these outcomes supported or conflicted with the 
goals of affected groups such as social movements, legislators, and the executive branch. I then 
examined similarities in the cases across the two amendments to get an understanding of the 
justification the courts used when deliberating the legality of expanding the electorate in various 
ways. For the Nineteenth Amendment I looked at Minor v. Happersett (1874) which was a case 
that examined how female suffrage fit in with American citizenship (Brozovich, 2002). To study 
the Supreme Court’s effect on the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment I reviewed the case 
of Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), which challenged the legality of the federal governments 
requirement of states to lower their voting ages to eighteen (Fish, 2012). There are hundreds of 
other Supreme Court cases relating to these amendments (Brozovich, 2002; Fish, 2012; 
Podolefsky, 1977), which I will not include in my analysis because research has demonstrated they 
are far less substantial than the two mentioned above. This is because these other cases did not 
gain as much attention from lawmakers and failed to set a court precedent of disenfranchisement. 
Despite this, these two specific cases were chosen as they set the precedent for future challenges 
for enfranchisement and played a considerable role on the dynamic of the movements for 
participatory amendments. To study these cases I analyzed the court’s judgment, dissenting 
opinion, and any public remarks made by the justices, legislators, or social movement leaders 
regarding the cases. I also looked for references to the court’s decisions in the debates within 
Congress and social movements to understand how the cases changed the approaches by these 
groups to accomplish their goals.  
 The historical inductive approach that I employed for this thesis has some important 
strengths but also some weaknesses. Strengths of this approach include the accessibility of most 
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of the information I used due to its availability in public government databases and social 
movement records, many of which have been digitized. This approach also allowed me to compare 
the congressional debates over these participatory amendments to see what factors were commonly 
cited amongst legislators when considering both of these amendments. My research design also 
permitted me to lay out the information relevant to the question posed by this thesis and synthesize 
a potential theory to answer the question. One weakness of this approach is that even with all my 
research, there will always be more documents relevant to the question. Another weakness of this 
approach comes with the interpretation of the relevant factors as measuring an exact impact of 
each is impossible; so, I instead outline what occurred and make deductions from there. Finally, 
this approach is weakened because I am only examining two cases as opposed to the five 
established participatory amendments. To have a truly representative sample and make 
considerable deductions a larger case study is required examining all five participatory 
amendments. Yet, these two cases examined in this thesis provide a first look at the factors 
conducive to the ratification of participatory amendments. 
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Chapter 2: The Nineteenth Amendment  
 The Nineteenth Amendment is the first of the two participatory amendments I analyze in 
this thesis. Here in the analysis section I will explain my findings pertaining to the Nineteenth 
Amendment and the informal factors that could have played a considerable role in the ratification 
of the legislation. I begin with an analysis of the social movements linked to this amendment 
followed by an examination of the governmental factors related to the Nineteenth Amendment.  
Examining the Nineteenth Amendment helped to highlight some of the key informal factors in its 
ratification. Social movements, specifically the NAWSA, helped shift popular opinion in favor of 
woman suffrage while being careful to avoid radical protests. President Woodrow Wilson was also 
demonstrated to be especially important to the ratification process because of his consistent support 
for a female suffrage amendment starting in his second term. Congressional records pertaining to 
the debate over a female suffrage amendment also repeatedly argued that women should be granted 
the right to vote because of their important contributions to the World War I war effort. These 
congressional records also repeatedly referenced the actions and data compiled by the NAWSA 
which demonstrates the importance of this social movement in shaping discussions within 
Congress. We will now transition to first examine the social movements in support of ratification 
of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
Social Movements 
With our focus on the Nineteenth Amendment, we will now transition to looking at the role 
of social movements in ratification. Social movements have long been successful in bringing the 
ideas of the populace to the forefront of public discussion and sometimes congressional debate. 
Understanding the power of these movements and their ability to pressure for change is important 
when considering the informal factors relevant to the ratification of participatory amendments. 
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When a large social movement demands change, legislators are forced to either support or resist 
the group. As the movement grows and gathers more support, lawmakers have greater incentive 
to support change to remain in line with their constituents’ opinions (Barrett, 2004). The power of 
social movements in the context of both participatory amendments analyzed in this thesis will be 
understood using McAdams’s (1982) political process model.  
 The major social movements related to the Nineteenth Amendment were the National 
American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), the American Woman Suffrage Association 
(AWSA), and the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA). Women had begun organizing 
to accomplish political goals together in July of 1848 following the Seneca Falls Convention, 
which is widely viewed as the start to the American women’s rights movement (Offen, 1999). 
Prior to winning the right to vote, women in America worked through various organizations to 
help promote the passage of other legislation. One example of this is how women played an 
integral role in the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment through various roles within the 
temperance movement. This previous work and experience led to connections to the Abolition, 
Populist, and Progressive movements, which proved helpful for the women’s movement as they 
were able to garner resources, support, and enrollment. (Banaszak, 1996). These networks 
provided invaluable experience to the women’s movement and were a key part in their ability to 
mobilize and pressure legislators for the Nineteenth Amendment. With these connections it is 
unsurprising that the women’s suffrage movement took hold especially in the early twentieth 
century. McAdams (1982) recognized the importance of connections like these with his 
“indigenous organization strength” factor and we can see that the suffrage movement had strong 
indigenous strength due to connections activists had with other movements. However, women 
suffrage groups had to navigate these relationships cautiously so as to reap the benefits without 
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the negative effects, such as making enemies with the strong liquor lobby, that associations with 
these groups brought (Burt, 2000). Evidence of this is especially prevalent within congressional 
debates regarding female suffrage, as the arguments advanced consistently discussed how the 
temperance amendment fit with proposed women’s suffrage. Representative John Moon even 
argued that representatives who voted in favor of the Eighteenth Amendment must vote in favor 
of woman’s suffrage as to not be hypocritical. He argued this because he believed constituencies 
held the same opinion on both these different issues and the desires of the constituents are a 
representative’s top priority (Cong. Rec. 56, 766, 1918). Moon’s logic proceeded as he explained 
that if a legislator voted in favor of the Eighteenth Amendment, in line with their constituents 
demands, they must do the same with female suffrage due to the linkage between the two 
proposals.  
Examining the social movements associated with the ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment has led me to focus my study on the American Woman Suffrage Association and the 
National Woman Suffrage Association. These two groups merged in 1890 to form the National 
American Woman Suffrage Association, making it the largest woman’s suffrage organization in 
the U.S. These national organizations were integral to the women’s suffrage movement; they 
united individuals from across the country, and their actions in mobilizing constituencies on the 
state-level were the primary driving force behind the formation of state-level suffrage movements 
(McCammon, 2001). The power held by these groups is further evident by the attention they 
received from political figures. One such politician was President Woodrow Wilson who 
personally spoke with the President of the NAWSA, Dr. Anna Shaw, and others about their 
grievances in 1913 when the movement gained enough leverage to warrant a discussion with the 
sitting president (Pusey, 2015).  
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Due to its temporal proximity the NAWSA certainly had the most direct effect on the 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment out of these three social movement organizations. To 
get a better understanding of this movement an examination of its predecessors is necessary. The 
first group we will examine is that of the National Woman Suffrage Association. The NWSA was 
formed in 1869 by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony in New York City. Anthony and 
Stanton formed the NWSA after failing to endorse the Fifteenth Amendment due to its addition of 
the word “male” to the U.S. Constitution. Stanton and Anthony firmly opposed the amendment 
and instead insisted that suffrage should be universal and not based upon sex (Heider, 2005). On 
the other hand, Stone and the AWSA saw the Fifteenth Amendment as a step towards women’s 
suffrage and thus endorsed it which lead to the suffrage movement’s split and the formation of the 
AWSA and NWSA (Social Welfare History Project, 2011). The Fifteenth Amendment was an 
important catalyst in the women’s suffrage movement as it helped provide activists with “cognitive 
liberation.” This is an important part of the Political Process Model and was achieved by the 
Fifteenth Amendment because women saw that their disenfranchisement could be challenged and 
changed, just as occurred with the long repression of the black man. The NWSA was concerned 
with a variety of women’s issues including the ease of divorce and women having property rights 
but their primary goal was outlined in their 1883 Constitution which states, “Article 2.- the object 
of this Association shall be to secure NATIONAL protection for women citizens in the exercise 
of their right to vote” (National Woman Suffrage Association, 1883). One important thing to note 
in this Constitution is the emphasis placed upon the word “national” by putting it in all capital 
letters. As the only word spelt out in solely capital letters out of the six articles in the constitution, 
the NWSA is demonstrating that they want female suffrage immediately by way of a federal 
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suffrage amendment. This difference is especially important as it separates the group from the 
AWSA which advocated suffrage on a state-by-state basis.      
The NWSA was engaged in a variety of strategies to accomplish their goals including 
litigation, protests, and petitions. In November of 1876 Elizabeth Cady Stanton created a petition 
that called on all American men and women to sign and demonstrate their refutation of the 
argument that women do not want the vote. This petition also called upon women active in the 
movement for the black vote to again become activists, but this time for their own suffrage, “we 
urge the women of this country to make now the same united effort for their own rights that they 
did for the slaves at the South when the thirteenth amendment was pending” (Buhle & Buhle, 
2005, p. 305). After failing to have the Fifteenth Amendment applied to women in Minor v 
Happersett, suffragists called upon the “indigenous organizations” (McAdams, 1982) which had 
previously organized and could be tapped into to advance the cause of female suffrage. Links to 
the temperance movement were also repeatedly referenced in the proceedings of the NWSA. Susan 
B. Anthony for example explained that women were also the leaders of the temperance movement 
and were important in demonstrating the capabilities of women and providing support for the 
growing female suffrage movement (National Woman Suffrage Association, 1884, p.36). The 
NWSA also noticed changing political circumstances when advocating for suffrage. These 
changes included the increase in Eastern European immigrants which women used to argue that 
these men had far less of a claim to the ballot than women, but still enjoyed the right. This was 
recognized in the 1889 NWSA Convention in a speech given by Olympia Brown. Brown also 
noted that women had become increasingly educated due to their ability to attend colleges and 
universities which entitled them to the vote far more than “the riff-raff of Europe” (Buhle & Buhle, 
2005, p. 320). With the dramatic increase of Eastern European immigration, suffrage activists 
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recognized the “political opportunities” (McAdams, 1982) available to them and exploited these 
to argue in favor of female suffrage. The NWSA was extremely active both on the national and 
state level in advocating for woman’s suffrage but was not the only social movement active at the 
time. 
The American Woman Suffrage Association was the competing sister organization of the 
NWSA and was founded by Lucy Stone and others in 1869. The AWSA was concerned solely 
with gaining female suffrage, as opposed to the NWSA which also advocated for fair divorce laws 
and education for women. The AWSA differed from the NWSA largely because of the means they 
employed to gain the vote. The AWSA’s plan for achieving this differed from the NWSA in that 
the AWSA wanted female suffrage through a state-by-state approach, “the American Suffrage 
Association has always recommended petitions to congress for a sixteenth amendment. But it 
recognizes the far greater importance of petitioning the State legislatures” (Buhle & Buhle, 2005, 
p.308). The previous statement was given by the chairman of the AWSA, Lucy Stone, in February 
of 1878. She argued in favor of a state-by-state approach to suffrage because that’s where the 
Constitution left the power and because she had no expectations for representatives of states 
without woman suffrage to ever refer such an amendment to their state legislatures. Stone’s ideas 
here are especially evident in the AWSA’s 1880 Constitution. The preamble of the document spoke 
of their methodology for achieving the vote and stated that a national organization was needed to 
coordinate women suffrage efforts that, “embody the deliberate action of the State and local 
organizations” (American Woman Suffrage Association, 1880, p.2). Furthermore, the second 
article of the document outlines the objects of the social movement and in section one it is stated 
that the object was, “to form auxiliary State Associations in every State where none such now 
exist, and to co-operate with those already existing” (American Woman Suffrage Association, 
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1880, p.2). The AWSA’s Constitution very clearly demonstrates the primary goal of the 
organization and the means to which they would achieve this goal. Being so different from the 
NWSA’s tactics, the AWSA’s plans were newsworthy as evident by their inclusion in a newspaper 
at the time, The Independent, “it [the AWSA] also makes the delegated body of representatives 
from states and societies the controlling power” (“American Woman’s Suffrage Convention,” 
1869).  
 The AWSA also differed from the NWSA in that it allowed both men and women to make 
up its ranks, including officer positions. This difference couldn’t be clearer as the NWSA thought 
that only women should be leading the movement for woman’s suffrage, while the AWSA had a 
man as their first president, Henry Ward Beecher, in addition to other men holding officer positions 
(American Woman Suffrage Association, 1880). The AWSA, although smaller than the NWSA, 
was able to promote their ideas nationally in part thanks to The Woman’s Journal. This periodical 
was the largest of the time advocating for national suffrage and was founded by Lucy Stone and 
Henry Blackwell, both of whom held officer positions in the AWSA (Heider, 2005). The journal 
ran from 1870-1917 and included various topics especially targeting women including poetry, 
international affairs related to women’s rights, achievements of American women, and most 
importantly, information relating to state movements in grating women the right to vote. The first 
publication outlined the goals of the periodical, “[a weekly newspaper] devoted to the interests of 
Woman, to her educational, industrial, legal and political Equality, and especially to her right of 
Suffrage” (“The Woman’s Journal,” 1870). Each weekly edition consisted of about eight pages 
entirely dedicated to issues relating to women. Due to little competition in this niche of the market, 
Mott and Blackwell’s newspaper became nationally renowned and was a crucial part of the 
AWSA’s ability to inform the public about women’s issues. This is the case because the journal 
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impacted the suffrage movement by providing individual women with information pertaining to 
their position in society and the need for change. With this information, ordinary women were able 
to connect with the ideas of the organization and be “cognitively liberated” (McAdams, 1982) as 
they recognized that their suppressed position was unfair and subject to change.  
 The Woman’s Journal epitomized the original strategy of the AWSA as it attempted to 
educate and gain support from the general populace. Although The Woman’s Journal was now 
here to stay, Mott, Blackwell, and the AWSA realized that their strategy for suffrage needed to be 
modified after Nebraska voted down a proposed female suffrage amendment in 1882. They thus 
decided to concentrate on lobbying state legislatures rather than general populace appeals because 
the general populace “were usually less enlightened than their legislators” (Wheeler, 1981, p.280). 
This change in strategy was further evident in a letter Henry Blackwell sent Lucy Stone on 
September 17, 1880. Blackwell, after arguing for a suffrage amendment, wrote of his humiliating 
defeat in front of a Massachusetts committee. Blackwell blamed the failure on him not having a 
single ally on the elected committee (Blackwell, 1880). The AWSA’s then shifted in strategy 
although they maintained that the best way to accomplish suffrage was by way of a state-by-state 
strategy. 
The AWSA’s state-by-state strategy was found to have little success which helped fuel the 
later formation of the NAWSA. The struggles of this approach are evident in the existence of 480 
campaigns, across thirty-three states, between 1870 and 1910 to get states to issue a referendum. 
Of these 480 attempts, just seventeen times did the states agree to allow a vote, and of these only 
two referenda succeeded, both after the AWSA merged with the NWSA in 1890 (Flexner, 1959, 
p. 222). The 1890 merger took three years of negotiations between the leaders of the AWSA and 
NWSA but was understood to be mutually beneficial, especially among the younger leaders of 
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both organizations. One young leader in particular was essential to the merger, Alice Stone 
Blackwell (the daughter of Lucy Stone) who led the negotiations and ensured the two groups would 
come together as the NAWSA (NWHM, 2020). The original factors that forced the creation of 
these two rival suffrage groups, over about two decades, became less and less prevalent. Both the 
AWSA and NWSA wanted women to have the right to vote above all else and both had made very 
little progress in achieving this goal since their formation in 1969. So rather than continue 
competing, the two groups merged in 1890 to form the National American Woman Suffrage 
Association which was devoted to obtaining female suffrage, separating itself from its radical 
image, and utilizing any and all beneficial situations for promoting this cause (Buhle & Buhle, 
2005). When the two groups finally merged, Elizabeth Cady Stanton was elected the first President 
amongst other prominent suffrage leaders including Susan B. Anthony, Carrie Chapman Catt, 
Lucy Stone, and Henry Blackwell. The NAWSA would have just under two million members by 
the time of the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification and undoubtedly helped gain women the right 
to vote through grassroot mobilization and petitioning of legislators. The rapid strength achieved 
by the NAWSA can be credited to the work of the NWSA and AWSA independently. These two 
groups provided considerable “indigenous organizational strength” (McAdams, 1982) to the 
NAWSA with their established organizational structures and considerable resources. The work of 
these groups prior to the formation of the NAWSA were crucial in helping to form the backbone 
of the social movement. 
The culmination of both the AWSA and NWSA’s goals and strategies is evident in the 
NAWSA’s Constitution which instituted ideas from both bodies. The Constitution outlined the 
two primary goals of the social movement as, “(1) to secure the vote to the women citizens of the 
United States by appropriate national and state legislation, and (2) to increase the effectiveness of 
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women’s votes in furthering better government” (National American Woman Suffrage 
Association, 1920, p. 7). To accomplish these goals the Constitution continues by explaining that 
the NAWSA will organize, support, and form auxiliary groups in all of the states, regardless of if 
they had adopted female suffrage or not. The Constitution also explained that every year the 
NAWSA would host a national convention to vote on plans and discuss the achievements of 
individual states. One thing that is clear from the NAWSA’s Constitution is that they wanted to 
form state-based organizations to supplement the national organization and ensure true grassroot 
mobilization. Through the decades this strategy would prove important to the NAWSA’s progress 
as each national convention would include testimonies from representatives of each state. These 
statements would explain the state specific measures being employed across the country as it was 
understood that each state had its own challenges in advocating suffrage (National American 
Woman Suffrage Association, 1913). 
From the start, the NAWSA used the force behind their social movement to directly address 
legislators. The exact size of the NAWSA at the founding is uncertain because some state-based 
suffrage auxiliaries failed to properly census their members and supporters. Despite this, the 
secretary of the NAWSA, Rachel Foster Avery, reported in 1893 that the NAWSA, “has thirty-
three auxiliary States, two hundred and forty-nine local and county societies, aggregating thirteen 
thousand one hundred and fifty members” (National American Woman Suffrage Association, 
1893, p.16). Much of this rapid membership can be credited to the work and accomplishments of 
the AWSA and NWSA in the previous years. The NAWSA was founded on the basis that they 
would avoid radical attempts to promote change which included protests, pickets, and hunger 
strikes, all of which would later be used by the smaller, more radical suffrage organization, the 
National Women’s Party (NWP). This was decided upon to try and limit the power of the “external 
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responses to insurgents” (McAdams, 1982) as larger external groups would be more hostile to the 
movement if the NAWSA was considered to be especially radical.  Instead the NAWSA attempted 
to convince legislators that suffrage was necessary by employing logical arguments for the right 
to vote. One such example of this is when Elizabeth Cady Stanton spoke before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on January 18, 1892. The NAWSA was able to appear before Congress 
quickly after conception due to its prestige gained because of its birth coming from two well-
established organizations. Although men and women had been appearing before the committee for 
decades to discuss suffrage, this 1892 speech by Stanton was concerned with drawing attention to 
women’s inability to self-determine their lives because of their lack of rights (“Hearing of the 
woman suffrage association,” 1892). Although one of the first times a member of the NAWSA 
testified before a congressional committee, this was certainly not the last time suffragists would 
appear before Congress. This is especially true of the NAWSA because of their focus on achieving 
change by conservative means. 
In addition to organizing state-based associations for women suffrage and petitioning 
Congress for a suffrage amendment, the NAWSA also held annual national conventions to discuss 
suffrage. Beginning in 1893, the proceedings of the National American Woman Suffrage 
Association’s yearly national conventions were printed in pamphlets and sold (depending on the 
year) for about fifteen cents each. These documents were printed until 1920 and contained 
important information relating to the association’s strategy and upcoming lobbying efforts. In 1899 
alone, NAWSA spent $298.70 on printing and postage of the meeting minutes which were then 
sent to all auxiliaries (National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1900, p. 18). Although 
this seems like a small number, it was about 3% of NAWSA’s entire 1899 budget which 
demonstrates the association’s commitment to informing Americans about the developments of 
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female suffrage. Overtime the amount of money spent by the NAWSA on printing this material 
increased, but at the same time the NAWSA’s budget grew rapidly largely due to membership 
dues and donations from wealthy members (National American Woman Suffrage Association, 
1904, p.49). NAWSA’s national conventions were especially important in coordinating the nation-
wide strategy for achieving suffrage. At some point, typically the start, during every convention 
the state delegates would spend a minimum of a half an hour discussing “state reports” which 
would include the developments of auxiliary suffrage associations in various states (National 
American Woman Suffrage Association, 1902). These testimonies would then be used while 
planning the national approach to suffrage to effectively coordinate the movement based on the 
needs of the auxiliaries. 
Although there existed several militant woman suffrage organizations, the NAWSA 
received accolades from Senator Key Pittman because, “they [the NAWSA] have conducted their 
campaign in a ladylike, modest, and intelligent way” (Cong. Rec. 56, 10843, 1918). The NAWSA 
was not classified as a militant suffrage group because they opted for traditional lobbying and 
petitions to legislators as opposed to picketing or protesting outside the White House in 
Washington D. C. March 3, 1913 is the sole exception to NAWSA’s antimilitant strategy. On the 
eve of President Wilson’s inauguration, the NAWSA staged an unprecedented public march in 
Washington D.C. The movement was organized and run by Alice Paul and Lucy Burns and 
featured over eight thousand women of professional, university, and homecare backgrounds 
marching in the parade (Dodd, 2008). A massive crowd also assembled to observe the march as 
many of the spectators harassed and jeered the women in the parade. The crowd quickly got out of 
hand and the police presence was not equipped for the near riot that occurred resulting in “over a 
hundred people were taken by ambulance to the hospital for treatment of their (mostly minor) 
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injuries” (Dodd, 2008, p.370). Paul, Burns, and NAWSA’s parade garnered extensive media 
attention and allowed for Paul to stand before the Senate just three days later to testify as to the 
goals, aims, and reactions to the march. Although a success, NAWSA leadership did not want 
protests to continue in this fashion because they were opposed to the violence that ensued and 
instead favored civil appeals to legislators. Lucy Burns and Alice Paul, who spearheaded this 
radical protest, then broke from the NAWSA to form the National Woman’s Party (NWP) in 1916 
(Buhle & Buhle, 2005). The NWP was far smaller and much more radical than the NAWSA and 
attempted to lobby for female suffrage with pickets outside the white house, marches in D. C., and, 
upon arrest, hunger strikes. Although the 1913 march in Washington D. C. succeeded in some 
respects, the NAWSA wanted to distance itself from these more radical efforts. Radical forms of 
lobbying proved especially harmful during World War I when questioning female suffrage 
publicly was interpreted as being anti-American. Advocating change along more traditional routes 
proved beneficial for the NAWSA, as evident in Senator Pittman’s statement, because Congress 
and legislators responded favorably to their “ladylike” actions. This was the ideal reaction for the 
NAWSA as “external responses” (McAdams, 1982) from Congress were in their favor because of 
their avoidance of radical protests.  
 As demonstrated in President Wilson’s speeches and the congressional record, a lot of the 
calls for female suffrage were made on the basis of women’s participation in WWI. This, in large 
part, can be credited to the NAWSA and their organization of women to aid in the war effort. 
Beginning in 1917 the NAWSA created a “War Service Department” and Nettie Rogers Shuler, 
the Corresponding Secretary of the NAWSA, explained at the 1917 national convention that, “our 
Association met and offered, in so far as it was able, the services of our more than two million 
women to the Government” (National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1917, p.87). With 
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the United States’ sudden entrance into the First World War in 1917, women had to fill expanding 
roles on the home front as men went overseas to fight. This is a clear example of McAdam’s (1982) 
conception of “political opportunities.” WWI provided incredible opportunities for women to 
contribute in the public sphere to the American cause. This allowed for the possibility of change 
via suffrage because women were able to demonstrate their value to the United States in a time of 
vulnerability. The NAWSA opened itself up to the war effort by creating the War Service 
Department which allowed women to work for the benefit of the U.S. through the NAWSA’s 
existing network while demonstrating women’s patriotism. By devoting considerable resources to 
the war effort, the NAWSA demonstrated women’s dedication to the U.S. and civic responsibility. 
The NAWSA’s War service Department had five sections which corresponded to the five principal 
tasks they identified as being essential to the war effort, “(1) money raising, (2) growing and 
conserving food, (3) caring for children and other dependents, (4) guarding public health, (5) 
protecting women in industry; and, of course, the usual tasks of nursing and providing clothes and 
bandages” (National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1919 , p.175-176). Suffragists, 
because they had demonstrated an exceptional ability to organize, were an obvious place for 
government officials to turn when help was needed during the Great War. The NAWSA played an 
integral role in organizing citizens to efficiently complete the tasks required of women during 
WWI. Although the NAWSA supported the American war effort, they did not give up in calling 
for female suffrage. In a 1918 speech titled “woman as a war measure,” Carrie Chapman Catt, the 
president of the NAWSA, explained how the greatest threat to the Axis powers was democracy. 
She argued that enfranchising women was essential to democracy and would help to halt the 
Kaiser’s attempts to spread autocracy. “All these aims [of the war effort] call for votes; there can 
be no self determination of people as to their form of government without votes” (Catt, 1918). 
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Catt’s speech was designed to show that for democracy to prevail in this war the United States 
must first ensure democracy to all its citizens at home, clearly demonstrating the extent to which 
WWI changed women’s “political opportunities” (McAdams, 1982). While a considerable amount 
of the NAWSA’s resources had to be diverted away from lobbying for suffrage and to the war 
effort, this dedication to the patriotic cause proved to be important when the Nineteenth 
Amendment was ratified.    
During the war, the NAWSA held a meeting in Indianapolis on April 17, 1918 during 
which the presidents of each of the forty-eight states’ auxiliaries of the national association met 
and prepared a resolution. This resolution was especially influential as it reached and influenced 
members of Congress. Senator John Shafroth read the resolution to the entire Senate before 
highlighting and agreeing with key arguments in favor of female suffrage. The primary argument 
of the resolution presented by him referenced the Declaration of Independence and the 
inconsistency in fighting for democracy without female suffrage. Shafroth closed his argument 
and discussion of the NAWSA’s resolution stating: “let us end this inconsistency and enthuse all 
of our people by adopting the joint resolution for a constitutional amendment granting equal 
suffrage to all of the governed of our States and Nation” (Cong. Rec. 56, 5805, 1918). Here Senator 
Shafroth referenced the NAWSA’s 1918 national convention when arguing to grant women the 
right to vote. Meeting minutes from the convention were readily available to legislators, like 
Shafroth, who’s reading of them demonstrated how Congress was responding to and considering 
the NAWSA’s actions. Even after Congress voted in favor of a female suffrage amendment in 
1919, the NAWSA continued to meet in 1920 to ensure the legislation was ratified. Carrie 
Chapman Catt, President of the NAWSA, explained how she was continuously lobbying 
legislators in state governments, especially Tennessee to ensure that the federal amendment would 
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be ratified (National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1920). This national convention in 
1920 would be the last for the NAWSA as the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified later that year. 
The NAWSA’s success in lobbying legislators through grassroot mobilization and contributing to 
the war effort finally proved triumphant as universal suffrage was adopted across the country.  
Presidential Support 
 The Nineteenth Amendment was ratified during the second term of President Woodrow 
Wilson, who served from 1913 to 1921. At the start of his presidential tenure, President Wilson, a 
native of Virginia, carried many of the sexist ideas of womanhood common amongst southerners 
(Lunardini & Knock, 1980). He came to office during the height of the women’s suffrage 
movement and was forced to address the issue due to its salience nationwide. Rather than become 
involved in the heated debate during his campaign, Wilson, in May of 1911, said that the issue of 
women suffrage should be left to each individual state, as opposed to the national government 
(Johnson, 2009). These original statements advocating for states’ rights in deciding this issue 
would be used by anti-suffragists for years, even after Wilson publicly changed his opinion on the 
matter (Cong. Rec. 58, 86, 1919). During December of 1913 President Wilson met privately with 
representatives from the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) but again 
declined to publicly support women suffrage despite showing concern for the movement (Johnson, 
2009).  
Women suffrage social movements, such as the NAWSA, paid little attention to obtaining 
presidential support for their cause until President Wilson came to office (Lunardini & Knock, 
1980). Social movements’ new focus on presidential support was due to the expanding power of 
the president during the start of the twentieth century. President Wilson finally publicly supported 
women suffrage during a speech on October 6th, 1915 when he explained that he would vote in 
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favor of New Jersey granting women the right to vote but maintained that the issue should be left 
to the states (NWHM, n.d.). This confirms the “New Way” of presidential leadership outlined by 
Tulis (1987). Here we start to see the shift of Wilson’s leadership to becoming more targeted to 
the general populace which becomes even more pronounced later in his tenure. Throughout his 
tenure as president, Woodrow Wilson remained sympathetic to the women’s suffrage movement 
but continuously failed to back national reform. His support and sympathy for the movement is 
especially evident from his September 9, 1916 address to the National American Woman Suffrage 
Association convention in Atlantic City. Wilson was optimistic about the women suffrage cause 
and explained that he would be an ally to the movement: “I have not come to fight against anybody, 
but with somebody” (Wilson, 1916). This convention was seen by some social movement leaders, 
such as Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, to be Wilson’s transformation towards 
support of the women suffrage cause (Johnson, 2009). The speech was cautious and contained no 
specifics as to what President Wilson would do to support the movement; but Wilson also notably 
did not mention states’ rights at all, which he had previously emphasized as the solution to the 
issue.  
Following the 1916 speech President Wilson began to support women’s suffrage, but only 
behind closed doors by meeting with various social movement leaders and congressmembers. On 
January 8, 1918, just two days before the House of Representatives was set to vote on a women 
suffrage amendment, President Wilson invited twelve state representatives to the White House and 
convinced them to endorse the suffrage amendment in the upcoming vote (Lunardini & Knock, 
1980). The following day, Wilson finally publicly came out in support of a women suffrage 
constitutional amendment. Although Wilson will continue to appeal directly to legislators on this 
subject, it is obvious here that Wilson is forming what Tulis (1987) terms, the “New Way” of 
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presidential leadership. Wilson is argued to be the first President to adopt this and it is evident that 
his strategy began this shift as he started to make more and more public appeals for suffrage as 
opposed to targeted congressional appeals. This shift took a lot of time as Wilson still targeted 
individual legislators while supporting the Nineteenth Amendment, but we do see him targeting 
the general populace more and more with his arguments. Wilson starting this shift will become 
especially evident in our analysis of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment as we see the presidents’ who 
supported that bill focusing almost solely on general populace appeals. 
Individual and targeted appeals to specific House and Senate members were not uncommon 
for President Wilson when attempting to gather congressional support for women’s suffrage. Such 
personal appeals continued during the Senate deliberations of the amendment; Wilson even wrote 
a personal letter to the Governor of Kentucky after the passing of Kentucky’s elected senator, 
Senator Ollie M. James. In the short letter (as cited in Hay, 2000) from August 30, 1918, Wilson 
urged the Governor to appoint a prosuffrage successor because of “how serious the consequences 
of a rejection may be” (p.220). President Wilson’s support of female suffrage is further evident in 
a letter he wrote to Carrie Chapman Catt on June 7, 1918, in which he explained how he hoped 
that the Senate would move quickly and pass a suffrage amendment prior to the end of their current 
session (Cong. Rec. 56, 7995, 1918). Although an exaggeration, Senator Smoot emphasized the 
significance of President Wilson’s letter: “the letter has already been published, I suppose, in 
nearly every paper in the United States” (Cong. Rec. 56, 7994, 1918). From here on out President 
Wilson was a firm supporter of women’s suffrage by way of a constitutional amendment; he even 
delivered a speech to the Senate professing his commitment to enfranchisement on September 30, 
1918 (just one day after Carrie Chapman Catt and William Gibbs McAdoo asked him to further 
support the proposed amendment) (Amar, 2005). Wilson framed his argument in the context of the 
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first World War, claiming that “the passage of this amendment is a vitally necessary war measure” 
(Wilson, 1918a). Woodrow Wilson repeatedly argued that women were an essential component of 
the war effort at home, and that enfranchisement was necessary to show the world that America 
was committed to democracy. Despite Wilson’s support for the amendment, the vote failed the 
very next day by just one vote (United States Senate, n.d.).  
President Wilson did not give up and instead continued to support women’s right to vote 
during his annual speech to Congress on the second of December in 1918, noting that “the least 
tribute we can pay to them [women] is to make them the equals of men in political rights as they 
have proved themselves their equals in every field of practical work they have entered” (Wilson, 
1918b). Wilson’s support for women’s suffrage was certainly understood within Congress and 
played a role on congressmembers supporting the legislation. One such example of this is 
Representative Campbell Cantrill calling for legislators to ignore their constituencies and instead 
follow the President’s recommendation, “follow the President’s advice and vote for this [woman’s 
suffrage] amendment. It will not do to follow the President in this great crisis in the world’s history 
on those matters only which are popular in your own districts. The true test is to stand by him, 
even though your own vote is unpopular at home” (Cong. Rec. 56, 764, 1918b). When the issue 
of suffrage appeared before the Sixty-Sixth Congress, some representatives again demonstrated 
their commitment to following President Wilson, “[President Wilson] sent us a message from 
across the waters, so anxious is he for woman suffrage. But I prefer to follow the President” (Cong. 
Rec. 58, 88, 1919). This steadfast support of President Wilson is applied to his opinion regarding 
female suffrage in the midst of the First World War and even after in 1919. These statements 
demonstrate Wilson’s ample power as some legislators would follow his policy decisions 
unwaveringly. In May 1919 President Wilson made another important contribution to the 
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ratification of the amendment in Paris when he convinced Senator William Harris to vote in 
support of suffrage at the urging of Alice Paul (Lunardini & Knock, 1980). With the support of 
other members of Congress, the amendment succeeded and went to the states for final ratification. 
Wilson again supported the amendment during this stage and wrote to representatives within 
Oklahoma (“Urges Oklahoma,” 1920), North Carolina (“Urges North Carolina,” 1920), Delaware 
(“Delaware vote,” 1920), Louisiana (“Baton Rouge,” 1920), West Virginia (“Wilson intervenes,” 
1920) and, at the urging of Catt, Tennessee (“Tennessee will act,” 1920) asking them to approve 
the proposed amendment. Woodrow Wilson started his presidency maintaining that the issue of 
women’s suffrage should be left to the states. This all changed as he became a major proponent of 
a constitutional amendment guaranteeing women the right to vote at the urging of social movement 
leaders during his second term as President. It is important to emphasize that President Wilson was 
not a steadfast supporter of suffrage but instead began supporting the movement at the urging of 
social movements. This contradicts Kernell’s (1993) idea of “going public” because President 
Wilson tended to react to the public and social movements in his support of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. This instead supports Edwards’s (2009) hypothesis on presidential influence as 
President Wilson became more accepting of the woman’s suffrage campaign after recognizing the 
changing political and social ideologies. By the time Wilson became committed to the cause, the 
NAWSA was well established and had met with Wilson privately on multiple occasions. Despite 
this, Wilson still played an important role in ratification because he provided the issue with 
additional salience and was able to successfully petition legislators and states to ratify the 
amendment.  
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Congressional Actions 
The second governmental institution that this thesis will analyze to understand its effect on 
the ratification of these participatory amendments is the actions of congressmembers. These men 
and women are responsible for crafting our laws and can have a major effect on ratification of 
amendments with continued and strategic support (Frantzich, 1979). Examining the discussions 
within Congress regarding women suffrage sheds light on the informal factors considered when 
passing the legislation. Similar to what later occurred with the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, support 
for woman suffrage within Congress followed certain trends. 
In the years leading up to the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, congressmembers 
continuously entered petitions for and against women suffrage from their constituencies. These 
documents would contain thousands of signatures from men and women across the country to 
advocate for or against women’s suffrage (Cong. Rec. 56, 220, 1917; Cong. Rec. 56, 701, 1918). 
Such constituent based lobbying efforts were repeatedly brought up in both houses of Congress. 
With few forms of communication available by which a constituent could contact their Senator or 
Representative, petitions became important to the suffrage debate as they demonstrated the beliefs 
and desires of citizens regarding the issue. These female suffrage petitions appear so commonly in 
the congressional record but there were still many more in circulation that were not entered in this 
source (Cong. Rec. 56, 1683, 1918). The frequency in which these petitions appeared is epitomized 
by Senator Smoot’s objection to a pro suffrage letter from President Wilson being entered into the 
congressional record. Senator Soot stated, “the Senator from Kansas knows that just a few days 
ago we had four or five pages of thee Record filled with petitions and letters upon this [female 
suffrage] subject. I can not see what earthly good can come from having the Record encumbered 
with letters of any kind” (Cong. Rec. 56, 7994, 1918). Petitions, especially of the pro-female 
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suffrage sort, were constantly being discussed in Congress and began to become too repetitive and 
cumbersome for some Senators, like Reed Smoot. The congressional documents also reveal that 
these petitions were largely mailed to representatives and senators on small scales. Rather than 
massive national petitions, although some did exist, these pleas for suffrage came from small local 
groups such as “the State Teachers’ Association, Baton Rouge, La.” (Cong. Rec. 56, 6081, 1918) 
or the “Equal Franchise League, of Stamford [Connecticut]” (Cong. Rec. 56, 5468, 1918). State 
specific petitions were also submitted by anti-suffrage groups and presented within Congress. Two 
such petitions were entered into the record by Senator Henry Lodge (MA) from “the anti-suffrage 
associations of New England and New York” (Cong. Rec. 56, 5739, 1918). Although pro-suffrage 
petitions were mentioned in both houses of Congress with greater frequency during the years 
preceding the Nineteenth Amendment, anti-suffrage pleas were still commonly sent to Congress 
from constituents.  
Congressmembers in favor of granting women the right to vote also repeatedly referenced 
the war effort as justification, just as President Wilson had. This idea was epitomized by the 
following statement made by Representative Jeannette Rankin which received a considerable 
amount of applause amongst representatives in the House: “how shall we explain to them the 
meaning of democracy if the same Congress that voted for war to make the world safe for 
democracy refuses to give this small measure of democracy to the women of our country?” (Cong. 
Rec. 56, 772, 1918). With the United States’ involvement in World War I on the basis of protecting 
democracy (at least from an Americentric viewpoint), many saw the lack of universal suffrage in 
the U.S. as contradicting this goal. The war was also used by legislators, such as Representative 
Ira Hersey, to justify enfranchising women because of their contributions to the American war 
effort: “the Red Cross women in the hospitals, in the ambulances, thousands on the battle fields, 
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risking their lives standing by man’s side in this great world war” (Cong. Rec. 56, 778, 1918). 
Congressmembers recognized that women were not only aiding the war effort on the front lines 
but also through war industries at home (Cong. Rec. 57, 232, 1918). However, other members of 
Congress used the war effort to argue that female suffrage should be put on hold until after the war 
as to focus all efforts on the conflict (Cong. Rec. 56, 3426, 1918). Finally, some congressmembers 
completely disconnected female suffrage from WWI, arguing that “we won every war we ever 
were in without woman suffrage and prohibition.” Here, Senator Brandegee continued by stating 
that women should not be attempting to create revolution at home and instead, “they had better go 
home and knit bandages and pick lint and get ready to take care of their brothers and sons and 
fathers who are going to be shot to pieces in the trenches abroad” (Cong. Rec. 56, 6151, 1918). 
Following his statement, Senator Gallinger briefly interrupted to say that women were contributing 
considerably to the war effort before Senator Brandegee completed his argument and the topic of 
discussion shifted to the economy of aeroplanes. The United States proved victorious in the First 
World War in November of 1918 without providing female suffrage, and legislators like 
Representative Edward Denison picked up on this, “the President [Woodrow Wilson] came before 
us and said that it was necessary to vote for woman suffrage, in order to win the war. Does the 
gentleman stand by the President in that? [Laughter.]” (Cong. Rec. 57, 1345, 1919). Antisuffragists 
were now able to defend their position by demonstrating that a key argument in favor of suffrage 
was ill-founded and that it was only advanced because of the lack of any other justification for 
providing women the right to vote (Cong. Rec. 57, 2907, 1919). These anti-women suffrage 
legislators were also now able to frame the previous attempts at female suffrage as attempts to 
usurp the power of the states and blatantly ignore and disrespect the Constitution (Cong. Rec. 57, 
3968, 1919). 
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A primary argument used against the enfranchisement of women was that the shaping of 
the electorate should be left to the states. As put by Representative Parker of New Jersey, “it is a 
fundamental right of the locality to determine its own electorate” (Cong. Rec. 56, 764a, 1918). 
This argument acknowledged the enfranchisement of African Americans by the Fifteenth 
Amendment, but explained that this amendment was not a precedent, but instead was simply an 
unusual exception caused by the Civil War. The only other option to grant women the right to vote 
would be for each individual state to pass an amendment to their constitution granting such 
suffrage (Cong. Rec. 56, 765, 1918). The issue of states’ rights was largely to blame for the 
eventual failure of a woman’s suffrage amendment in the House of Representatives on January 10, 
1918. The House rejected female suffrage by a vote of 131 yeas to 273 nays with many anti-
suffrage representatives citing the 1916 Democratic and Republican platforms in their decisions. 
These platforms supported female suffrage but insisted that the change come from the states. 
Representative William Gordon explained that voting for a female suffrage amendment was 
morally wrong because of these platforms: “any man in this House, whether Democrat or 
Republican, who votes for this [female suffrage amendment] resolution, and who did not in the 
campaign in 1916 publicly repudiate that plank in his platform, is guilty of bad faith with his 
constituents, every single one” (Cong. Rec. 56, 769, 1918). Having been elected under the 
aforementioned platforms, congressmembers were largely forced to vote against female suffrage 
to avoid hypocrisy in 1918, regardless of their individual opinions. In later debates over women’s 
suffrage, proponents of a constitutional amendment repeatedly referenced the plan of leaving 
enfranchisement to the states. They argued that this process was completely unjust because women 
in states such as New York already had the right to vote while women in other states, such as 
Tennessee, lacked suffrage (Cong. Rec. 56, 10782, 1918). Congressmembers emphasized this 
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injustice and used it as justification when arguing for universal female suffrage. These legislators 
were also able to point to some Western states that had already enfranchised women as 
counterexamples to various claims, such as Representative Edward Little’s belief that women in 
politics would tear apart households (Cong. Rec. 58, 80, 1919). In addition to referencing Western 
states, legislators, like Representative John Raker, also pointed to foreign countries such as 
England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and others as positive examples of enfranchising 
women (Cong. Rec. 58, 82, 1919).  
Members in both houses of Congress also repeatedly referenced fairness when attempting 
to promote female suffrage. The right to vote in the United States is considered a privilege by the 
Supreme Court (Minor v Happersett, 1874) but some legislators including Senator John Shafroth 
questioned this, “it [voting] is a privilege that exists after man has assumed all the powers of 
government and has said: ‘This right shall not be extended except with my consent.’ That is not 
fair; it is simply an assumption, a usurpation of power” (Cong. Rec. 56, 2777, 1918). Appeals 
arguing that man’s domination at the polls was unfair were not uncommon because, by the late 
1910’s, many Americans began to understand that the prohibition of women from the polls was 
unjust. These feelings of injustice stemmed from the belief that women’s suffrage is a natural right 
and women deserve the ability to participate in their country’s affairs especially because “we allow 
idiots and lunatics to vote [if they are men]” (Cong. Rec. 56, 10782, 1918).      
Senators and Representatives in their respective chambers of Congress also repeatedly 
referenced education and intelligence in arguing both for and against female suffrage. Some 
congressmembers argued that women simply did not possess the intellect to vote. Senator Andrieus 
Jones argued against this claim, using evidence such as “by the census of 1910 there were about 
22,000,000 educated women over 21 years of age and about 2,000,000 illiterate ones” (Cong. Rec. 
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56, 10926, 1918). When discussing female suffrage, pro-suffrage legislators repeatedly referenced 
women as “patriotic and intelligent” to help counter the female deficiency claims of anti-suffragists 
(Cong. Rec. 56, 10979, 1918). Representatives from states where women suffrage was already 
instituted were also able to attest to the brilliance of women elected to their state legislatures. One 
such example is Representative William Newell’s statement: “they are all women that we have 
elected to the two branches of our State legislature, and I would willingly submit them to a 
comparison with an equal number of men legislators” (Cong. Rec. 58, 87, 1919). States such as 
Colorado were able to provide direct evidence as to the abilities and intelligence of women in 
political settings. The intelligence of women was also argued by congressmembers, like 
Representative Adolphus Nelson, to be necessary for the U.S. in attempting to reconstruct the 
world because of the incredible destruction caused by World War I (Cong. Rec. 58, 83, 1919).   
A joint resolution for granting female suffrage was repeatedly argued for and against within 
the Senate during 1918, but the timing of the vote for the proposed amendment had special 
importance. One such example of this occurred on the 27th of June when a motion to vote on the 
proposed amendment was made in the Senate. After debate, a roll call, and discovering that a 
quorum was present, Senator Andrieus Jones revoked his motion because other senators feared 
that a vote would be rushed and result in failure since the prevailing belief was that the Senate 
should focus their energy on a bill regarding federal revenue relating to the war effort (Cong. Rec. 
56, 8353, 1918). The proposed constitutional amendment was tabled again after a similar situation 
occurred on June 6th of the same year. On June 6th, Senators in favor of female suffrage wanted to 
ensure the amendment would pass with the necessary two-thirds majority and noticed that of the 
senators present that day they would not succeed in the vote and decided to delay. Such actions 
were picked up on and criticized by anti-suffrage senators, but pro-suffrage men held the majority 
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and thus could manipulate the process in favor of their objectives (Cong. Rec. 56, 7411, 1918). 
The importance of the personnel present for a vote is evident by the Senate’s vote on the joint 
resolution for female suffrage on February 10, 1919 which failed by a vote of 55 (yeas) to 29 
(nays), but was quickly reintroduced for consideration by Senator Wesley Jones (Cong. Rec. 57, 
3062, 1919).  
With the start of the Sixty-Sixth Congress in 1919 the woman suffrage amendment was 
quickly taken up once again in the House. With strong bi-partisan support for a female suffrage 
amendment by this point, congressmembers of both political parties wanted to ensure that their 
party’s support for the amendment was on record, likely for future political reasons. One example 
of this was demonstrated by Representative Claude Kitchin who repeatedly emphasized the 
attempts of the previous Democrat controlled Congress in ratifying a female suffrage amendment 
to ensure the now Republican controlled Congress would not receive all the credit (Cong. Rec. 58, 
81, 1919). Despite both parties seeking credit for the eventual adoption of a female suffrage 
amendment, there still existed individual legislators opposed to the amendment because of the 
issue of states’ rights and setting a precedent (Cong. Rec. 58, 81, 1919). One of these legislators 
was Representative Frank Clark who firmly believed that enfranchising women through an 
amendment would end states’ rights and allow for a “Pandora’s box” of other federal changes to 
dominate the will of each state (Cong. Rec. 58, 89, 1919). The other arguments frequently 
employed against the 1919 vote on the proposed amendment were simple sexist remarks which 
argued that women belonged in the home and did not desire nor belong in the political sphere 
(Cong. Rec. 58, 89, 1919; Cong. Rec. 58, 92, 1919). After about two hours of debate in the newly 
formed House of Representatives during the Sixty-Sixth Congress, the proposed amendment was 
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put to a vote. On May 21, 1919 the House voted in favor of the proposed constitutional amendment 
by a two-thirds majority, 304 (yeas) to 90 (nays) (Cong. Rec. 58, 94, 1919).  
The Senate was now forced to examine the issue of a women suffrage amendment and did 
so just a couple of weeks later. The first idea to appear in the deliberations over the amendment in 
the Senate was introduced by Senator Pat Harrison and suggested a change to the proposed 
amendment that would limit its application only to white women (Cong. Rec. 58, 557, 1919). The 
issue of enfranchising black women had appeared occasionally throughout previous deliberations 
in Congress, but this change was here supported by sixteen senators (and opposed by fifty-nine) 
demonstrating the racist ideology prevalent at the time. With the failure of this proposed change 
the Senate was then able to deliberate upon the passage of the woman suffrage bill approved by 
the House. The debate followed a very similar structure to the House as much of the opposition 
came on the grounds that this issue should be left to the states (Cong. Rec. 58, 561, 1919). Some 
pro-suffrage senators from states with female suffrage, like Senator James Wadsworth of New 
York, even sided with this argument. This demonstrates how the states’ rights issue was larger 
than just about female suffrage (Cong. Rec. 58, 616, 1919). With expectations that the proposed 
amendment would be ratified, some anti-suffrage senators proposed that this amendment should 
instead follow the constitutional convention path to ratification as a last-ditch attempt to get more 
participation from the people and states (Cong. Rec. 58, 566, 1919; Cong. Rec. 58, 567, 1919). 
Understanding that woman suffrage, if left to a popular vote, would likely fail, some senators who 
prioritized states’ rights felt that this was the only just option to enfranchising women while 
respecting the wills of the people and states. The attempts to accomplish this repeatedly failed 
leading up to the final vote as Senator James Phelan argued that it was just a delaying tactic to 
push female suffrage further into the future (Cong. Rec. 58, 633, 1919). After hours of debate and 
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proposed amendments to the female suffrage amendment, on June 4, 1919 the Senate finally voted 
in favor of woman suffrage by a vote of fifty-six yeas, twenty-five nays, and fifteen senators not 
voting (Cong. Rec. 58, 635, 1919).   
The Supreme Court 
Aside from social movements, congressmembers, and presidential support provided to the 
Nineteenth Amendment, the decisions of the Supreme Court was also an important informal factor 
to the ratification of this participatory amendment. As the highest court in our country, the 
decisions of the Supreme Court affect the actions that the other branches of our government must 
take when creating and enforcing legislation. This is especially evident with the issue of women’s 
suffrage, which was challenged within the Supreme Court (on more than one occasion) prior to 
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. One Supreme Court case was especially prevalent 
in setting the precedent for the need of an amendment to expand suffrage to women. This case was 
Minor v. Happersett (1874), which examined how women suffrage fit in with American citizenship 
(Brozovich, 2002).  
Minor v. Happersett was brought before the Supreme Court after a Missouri woman, 
Virginia Minor, attempted to register to vote in the 1872 presidential election. Her attempt to 
register was rejected by the registrar, Reese Happersett, so Minor and her husband decided to sue 
Happersett. Their case was based around the privileges and immunities clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment which stated that “no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, anyone born in the U.S. is considered a citizen; Minor argued that since 
she was a natural born citizen the state of Missouri could not stop her from voting. Her case rested 
upon the assumption that the right to vote falls under “the privileges or immunities of citizens” 
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(U.S. Const. amend. XIV). The court first had to determine if Minor was considered a citizen of 
the U.S. Answering this question proved simple for the court, as a natural born woman’s status as 
a citizen had never been questioned or abridged previously in the U.S. This, in addition to 
interpretation of English common law, allowed the court to unanimously conclude “women have 
always been considered as citizens the same as men” (Minor v. Happersett, 1874).  
The Supreme Court then had to determine if female suffrage applied under the “privileges 
and immunities of citizens.” The justices answered this conundrum with a strict no because had 
such a change been intended then “it would have been expressly declared” (Minor v. Happersett, 
1874) and not left up to implication. The justices then reasoned that, at the founding, individual 
states restrictively outlined who would have the privilege to vote in their state constitutions. The 
existence of disenfranchisement located within state constitutions further backed their argument 
that had women suffrage ever been intended it would have been expressed in legislation, just as 
disenfranchisement is specifically authorized. Indeed, “nothing less than express language would 
have been employed to effect so radical a change” (Minor v. Happersett, 1874). Concluding their 
affirmation of a lower court’s decision, the justices who presided over this case explained that they 
were upholding the decision not because it’s what is right, but because it is what is written in the 
law. The decision also contains multiple invitations for Congress to enfranchise women; but 
maintains that if suffrage is to be applied to women it must explicitly come from the states or 
Congress. The Supreme Court in this case reinforced the conception of Rosenberg’s (2008) 
“constrained court.” This is the case because the court recognized that female disenfranchisement 
may not be just and invited legislators to change the situation. The Supreme Court here is clearly 
relying on outside actors for social change to occur as they are unable to craft or enforce legislation 
on their own due to the separation of federal powers.   
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Chapter 3: The Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
 We now have a firm understanding of the three informal factors related to the Nineteenth 
Amendment and will shift our focus to an identical analysis of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 
First, this chapter examines the social movements advocating for the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 
Then, I examine the governmental institutions pertaining to this particular amendment. Throughout 
this chapter I keep in mind earlier findings pertaining to the Nineteenth Amendment to help set up 
the conclusion chapter’s comparison of the factors related to both amendments. This examination 
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment finds certain informal factors to be notably important to the 
ratification process. First and foremost is the importance of the social movement, the Youth 
Franchise Coalition, in compiling data for legislators and establishing a nonradical grassroot 
mobilization for enfranchisement on both the state and national levels. Congressional records also 
indicate that legislators wanted to enfranchise eighteen-year olds to end radical protests plaguing 
college campuses across the country. These same documents also demonstrated that the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment was ratified in part because of legislators’ arguments pertaining to young 
American’s great contributions to the Vietnam War effort. Presidential support for this amendment 
also proved useful for ratification as various presidents modestly supported youth enfranchisement 
while in office. To begin this chapter, we will now shift our focus to social movements which 
advocated for the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.  
Social Movements  
Despite its ratification occurring in 1971, the movement advocating for lowering the voting 
age began during the Second World War after President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed legislation 
which lowered the minimum age of the military draft from twenty-one to eighteen. Immediately 
following this legislation in 1942, Oklahoma’s representative, Victor Wickersham, proposed an 
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amendment to lower the voting age to coincide with the military draft. Decades of debate over the 
potential change and several proposed amendments then ensued.  
Social movements appeared during this period of debate demanding that the government 
lower the voting age. These groups included relatively new organizations like the Youth Franchise 
Coalition, which worked exclusively to promote youth suffrage, but relied heavily on existing 
organizations with other goals in addition to youth suffrage. The Youth Franchise Coalition 
pressured for the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment by coordinating a national campaign 
across multiple states and smaller social movements for an amendment that would lower the voting 
age. All these movements to lower the voting age were centered around the slogan, which became 
especially popular during the Vietnam War, “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” (Abraham, 
1954; Amsden, 2011). This slogan was founded upon the cognitive capacity of teenagers, as 
advocates of lowering the voting age argued that eighteen-year old’s were capable of making 
informed political decisions just as they were able to sacrifice their lives for their country (Amsden, 
2011). Furthermore, research into this subject has found that the previous civil rights movements 
that enfranchised women (Nineteenth Amendment) and the poor (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) 
had increased Americans’ sympathy for depravations of rights, especially to soldiers during the 
Vietnam war (Fish, 2012). This sympathy allowed the social movements to garner significant 
support and press for change. There was a considerable amount of pushback against lowering the 
voting age to eighteen when movements first began; but, by the time of ratification, support for 
such an amendment was widespread (both the Democratic and Republican party platforms 
supported youth suffrage in 1968) (Amsden, 2011).  
The Youth Franchise Coalition (YFC) was formed in 1969 when groups such as the Young 
Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
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People (NAACP), and National Education Association (NEA) decided to form an organization 
dedicated to lobbing for a constitutional amendment (“40 years ago”, 2019). All in all there were 
thirty three members of the YFC (U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1970, p.44). The 
combination of the YMCA, NAACP, and NEA brought together a range of youth, educational, 
and civil rights organizations to collectively work for a youth enfranchisement amendment. These 
groups provided the YFC with a significant amount of “indigenous organization strength” 
(McAdams, 1982). Groups like the YMCA, NEA, and NAACP were well established by the late 
1960s and managed to pool their resources together to form the YFC. The YFC’s success relied 
heavily on these connections which supported the movement for youth suffrage with their available 
resources. As calls for enfranchising eighteen-year olds increased during the Vietnam War, the 
Youth Franchise Coalition was created to streamline the social movement and lobby both local 
and federal legislators. As stated by the New York Times, “the Youth Franchise Coalition, [is] a 
Washington-based group that has organized state drives to extend the vote” (“15 states to act,” 
1970). Following its creation, the Youth Franchise Coalition was immediately on the radar of 
legislators such as Representative William Ford, “I am happy to note today the organizational 
meeting of the Youth Franchise Coalition which will spearhead activities aimed at extending the 
right to vote to those who have reached the age of 18” (115 Cong. Rec. 2824, 1969)”. With 
considerable “indigenous organizational strength” due to its founding originating from several 
well-established social movements, the YFC quickly situated itself on the radars of influential 
legislators.  
One concern that the Youth Franchise Coalition was forced to address were the student 
protests occurring through the late 1960s and early 1970s. These protests were harmful to the youth 
suffrage movement. As stated by the director of the Youth Franchise Coalition, Ian R. MacGowan, 
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“student disorders have created resentment, and many adults won’t give voting power to young 
people, whom they consider ‘irresponsible.’ The outcome in specific state referendums this fall 
[1970] will depend to a large extent on how much trouble there is on each state’s campuses” (“15 
states to act,” 1970). MacGowan’s statement here is unsurprising because even those most 
supportive of youth enfranchisement recognized that these militant protests were not helping their 
cause. In 1969, the “father” of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, Senator Jennings Randolph, told 
members of the Youth Franchise Coalition at the NEA headquarters that campus disorders were 
slowing Congress’s consideration of youth suffrage and that success would never be achieved as 
long as their image was “of militant demonstrators and beatniks” (“young lobby group,” 1969). 
This sentiment was also repeated by Senator Bayh who told the group that “student unrest will 
lead some people to question the wisdom of lowering the voting age” (“young lobby group,” 1969). 
Senators Bayh and Randolph were two of the largest proponents of a youth suffrage amendment 
yet had considerable concerns with the student protests which were turning popular and legislators’ 
opinions against enfranchisement. These radical protests were frowned upon by society and 
contributed to negative “external responses” (McAdams, 1982) to the YFC, like the negative 
feelings towards radical protests which advocated for the Nineteenth Amendment. To successfully 
achieve enfranchisement the YFC had to convince legislators that youths should have the right to 
vote while overcoming negative conceptions relating to young Americans’ unruliness on college 
campuses. Understanding that many eighteen to twenty-one year olds in the United States, 
including the YFC, were not a part of these radical protests, Senator Barry Goldwater argued, 
“what about the supposedly mature persons who would deny the right to vote to nearly 11 million 
citizens just because a tiny minority has engaged in militant behavior?” (U.S. Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 1970, p. 132). Not all legislators linked the militant actions of some young 
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Americans to the entire suffrage campaign, but some did which forced the above statement to try 
and separate the two. Ian MacGowan made similar statements on behalf of the YFC because they 
did not want to be associated with these unruly actions. Alan M. DiScuillo, a researcher for the 
YFC, argued in front of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary against linking the youth suffrage 
movement with the militant strategy based upon a logical fallacy, “opposition to a lower voting 
age on the grounds of student disorders amounts to the fallacy of begging the question,” he 
continues by referencing a survey across college campuses which, “concludes that without 
sufficient political influence, they [college students] often turn to the streets and violence” (U.S. 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1970, p. 59). Here, DiScuillo reasoned that anyone who was 
against youth suffrage because of radical youth protests is arguing in a circle because the premise 
of their claim (radical youth protests) doesn’t support the conclusion (that youths are too immature 
to vote) but instead assumes its truth. The militant protests plaguing college campuses at the time 
forced the YFC to respond accordingly as various arguments were used to separate these militant 
protests from the YFC’s conservative work with legislators to limit the negative “external 
responses” to the YFC. 
The Youth Franchise Coalition was also able to frame their support for youth suffrage in 
terms of the Vietnam war. As anti-war sentiments intensified across the United States, the Youth 
Franchise Coalition was able to link enfranchising eighteen-year olds with ending the war. This is 
especially evident in a 1970 advertisement published in the New York Times titled “what can one 
American do to end this illegal war?” The fourth item on the checklist to help stop the Vietnam 
War was, “4. Support the movement to lower the voting age to 18. Write your Senators and 
Congressman and/or encourage the lobbying efforts of Youth Franchise Coalition” (“what can one 
American do,” 1970). This was not the only occurrence of such ads appearing in newspapers in an 
WHAT DOES IT TAKE?  57 
 
 
 
attempt to link the Youth Franchise Coalition with helping to solve the increasingly unpopular 
Vietnam War (“we the undersigned writers,” 1970). The Vietnam War provided the YFC with the 
“political opportunity” (McAdams, 1982) to challenge for youth suffrage during a period in which 
young Americans were taking on increasingly important roles in the U.S. The Vietnam War 
completely changed the American way of life and provided the opportunity for young Americans 
to demonstrate their worth to the U.S. and petition for reform.  
The Youth Franchise Coalition was the most referenced social movement when it came to 
congressional discussions relating to lowering the voting age to eighteen. Senator Jennings 
Randolph explained the actions of the group to the entire Senate in 1969, “the YFC has established 
a national network of organizations. In every State, they are bringing local voting groups and 
interested individuals together to create steering committee for a unified campaign-to lower the 
voting age. Additionally, YFC is working with Members of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives” (Cong. Rec. 115, 23523, 1969). Senator Randolph’s statement regarding the YFC 
demonstrates the salience that they had in the national debate pertaining to youth enfranchisement. 
The work of the YFC was also important to congressional debates because they compiled 
information that was then used to justify youth enfranchisement. One such example this comes 
from a statement made by Senator Bayh, “according to a publication of the Youth Franchise 
Coalition, the Governors of 20 States have indicated support for lowering the voting age to 18” 
(U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1970, p.126). The YFC was able to compile important 
information regarding youth suffrage through their lobbying efforts which was then used to create 
arguments for youth suffrage. 
The Youth Franchise Coalition’s work in promoting youth suffrage on the state level is 
also evident in the congressional record which contained a twelve page long section titled: “Youth 
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Franchise Coalition State-by-State Rundown” (U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1970). 
This report provided to Congress by the YFC contained a breakdown of each of the fifty states’ 
youth suffrage actions. Each state was broken down into four parts to provide information relating 
to if the governor of that state supported youth suffrage, if there was a referendum or legislation 
pending, if the YFC had an organization in the state, and, the most substantial section, which broke 
down state specific laws, social movements, and other advancements in pursuit of youth suffrage 
(U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1970). For example, the YFC’s breakdown of Alaska 
explained that the governor supports youth suffrage, there is a YFC campaign operating in the 
state, and that there would be a referendum vote on the topic in August 1970. The fourth and most 
detailed section explained that: Alaska’s legislators voted in 1969 to send a referendum to the 
citizens; how the Youth Franchise Coalition was “contacting legislators on the issue and supplying 
statistics, brochures, and buttons” (p.607); the positive feelings about enfranchising youth in the 
state amongst state officials (U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1970). Detailed breakdowns 
similar to the Alaskan example provided above were done for each of the fifty states and 
demonstrated the grassroot efforts of the YFC. The Youth Franchise Coalition and their member 
organizations were essential in gathering and presenting information related to youth 
enfranchisement in an attempt to get legislators in Congress on board with suffrage as well. 
Although “cognitive liberation” was well established for people involved in the movement by this 
point, this report contained information crucial to educating legislators and the public about their 
cause. With this information, uninformed readers could become “cognitively liberated” 
(McAdams, 1982) regarding youth suffrage because they can see that the undesirable 
disenfranchisement of young Americans could be challenged and changed.  
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 The effort of the Youth Franchise Coalition in promoting youth suffrage demonstrated that 
young Americans were committed to earning the right to vote. This went a long way with some 
legislators including Representative Glenn Anderson, “young persons are demonstrating their 
desire for the right to vote by mobilizing a broad national effort. They are not merely sitting back 
asking Congress to give them this right but instead are mounting a broad-based campaign across 
the country,” Anderson then specifically mentions the YFC in relation to this, “another group, 
Youth Franchise Coalition, has been set up in cooperation with the National Education Association 
for a concerted national effort to secure passage of a constitutional amendment to extend voting 
rights to 18-year-old citizens” (115 Cong. Rec. 2827, 1969). By organizing on the grassroot level 
and later petitioning Congress and state legislatures, the YFC demonstrated considerable 
commitment to youth enfranchisement. The YFC compiled useful information regarding youth 
suffrage and was able use this information, among other tactics, to pressure Congress into 
eventually adopting the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
Presidential Support 
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment received support from various presidents because the idea 
of lowering the voting age to eighteen had been prevalent for decades prior to ratification 
(Abraham, 1954). The first president to provide substantial support for such an amendment was 
President Dwight Eisenhower. Revising his immediate predecessor’s (President Truman) 
disinterest, President Eisenhower publicly supported lowering of the voting age in his 1954 State 
of the Union speech- a speech that gave the issue publicity and helped to garner greater support 
for an eventual change (Fish, 2012; Grossman, 2012). This was Eisenhower’s first State of the 
Union address and was powerful in its call for youth suffrage. “For years our citizens between the 
ages of 18 and 21 have, in time of peril, been summoned to fight for America. They should 
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participate in the political process that produces this fateful summons” (Eisenhower, 1954b). Here 
Eisenhower, as did most proponents of lowering the voting age, linked his argument to the idea 
that soldiers should be given the right to vote. Eisenhower’s call for youth suffrage is brief and 
appears just prior to his closing remarks; but it is meaningful, as he makes this call during his first-
time addressing Congress as a whole. Towards the end of Eisenhower’s 1955 State of the Union 
Address he again briefly urged Congress to pass an amendment that would lower the voting age 
(Eisenhower, 1955). This was the last of Eisenhower’s State of the Union addresses that called for 
youth suffrage despite his delivering of six more such addresses in the years to follow.  
 Eisenhower’s public support for lowering the voting age in federal elections does not 
extend much past these two speeches. The sole exception to this is an address he gave on 
September 23, 1954 at the Hollywood Bowl, when he made a brief statement that the next Congress 
must address lowering the voting age (Eisenhower, 1954a). Another similarly short mention of 
lowering the voting age occurred in a 1956 White House statement explaining that Eisenhower 
and Republican congresspeople would meet later that afternoon to discuss the issue (Eisenhower, 
1956). Eisenhower did not release any other statements regarding the meeting or what was 
discussed with the members of Congress.  
 The second of three presidents found to have played a role in the ratification of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment was President Lyndon Johnson. While President Eisenhower spoke of youth 
suffrage on just a few occasions, and in very little detail, President Johnson provided much more 
support for the movement, including lengthy speeches advocating the change. Johnson was an 
outspoken supporter of lowering the voting age in the midst of the Vietnam War, which had 
adopted a draft just one year after Johnson took office in 1963. It is notable that President Johnson’s 
continuous support for youth enfranchisement did not prove successful while he was in office. 
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This contradicts “going public” (Kernell, 1993) because we see congressmembers continue to 
resist youth enfranchisement despite considerable public support for it. Instead we see more 
support for Edwards (2009) hypothesis as President Johnson (and President Nixon as we will see) 
attempted to fashion his pro-suffrage strategy around the war effort as he recognized the political 
opportunity to do so. While in office, Johnson used his position as president to promote lowering 
the voting age and favorably compared the movement to the women’s suffrage movement 
(Sarabyn, 2008). 
 Much of Johnson’s first years in office were focused on promoting civil rights legislation 
that would end the disenfranchisement of black Americans, especially in the South. Later in his 
tenure as president, Johnson began to also promote youth suffrage more fervently. In June of 1968 
Johnson showed commitment to the youth suffrage movement in a speech entirely dedicated to the 
issue. During the speech President Johnson reviewed each of the four previous amendments that 
had expanded the electorate and emphasized how beneficial they all proved for America. Johnson 
provided a number of reasons for youth enfranchisement, including: their service to our country; 
their being treated the same as adults in court; greater communication, which exposes youths to 
the current political issues; and their increased levels of education (Johnson, 1968b). Just prior to 
concluding the speech, President Johnson emphasized that it was now the time for such an 
amendment to be ratified because it had received bi-partisan support for years and had been 
proposed more than fifty times in the 90th Congress alone (Johnson, 1968b). Later that same year 
Johnson again called for the enfranchisement of youths and also requested that all state and local 
governments include youth fellowship programs such as the one that existed in the White House 
(Johnson, 1968a). President Johnson’s speech indicated how he valued young Americans’ ideas in 
his administration and hoped for greater youth engagement in governance nationwide. 
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President Johnson’s successor, President Richard Nixon, played a similar role in the 
ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. By the time Nixon was elected president, the youth 
suffrage movement was well entrenched in American society and did not need much additional 
support for enactment. Nixon was a supporter of granting America’s youth the right to vote and 
was a proponent of this change coming by way of a constitutional amendment. Nixon quickly 
expressed his support for youth suffrage in October of 1968 after speaking with young leaders 
across the country. As he stated in a radio address, “the reason the voting age should be lowered 
is not that 18-year-olds are old enough to fight-it is because they are smart enough to vote” (Nixon, 
1968). Nixon’s argument for youth enfranchisement during his presidential campaign explained 
that the youth of the day were much better educated than their parents at the same age, and thus 
had the capabilities to knowledgably participate in the American democracy. Just four months 
later, Nixon again publicly mentioned his administration’s commitment to youth suffrage by way 
of a constitutional amendment, using the same reasoning as the aforementioned speech (Nixon, 
1969). Nixon’s speech was also referenced by Representative Herbet Lee when he was explaining 
the various sources from which support for youth suffrage was coming (Cong. Rec. 115, 14232, 
1969). President Nixon had a short tenure in office prior to the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment but in this time he aggressively pursued a youth franchise amendment with various 
public appeals. Like President Woodrow Wilson with the Nineteenth Amendment, President 
Nixon’s support of the amendment was in reaction to the public and widespread social movements 
calling for the enfranchisement of youths. This confirms the hypothesis of Bodnick (1990) that 
presidents tend to react to the public and media when supporting legislation. We also see a limited 
confirmation here of Kernell’s (1993) “going public” as Nixon appealed to the general population 
on multiple occasions when supporting youth suffrage to garner additional support. This is only 
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limited though because there is clear evidence that President Nixon took up the issue after it had 
already gained considerable public and media attention.  
During Nixon’s tenure as President, Congress passed the 1970 Voting Rights Act’s 
extension which contained a provision lowering the voting age to eighteen in all federal and state 
elections. Nixon supported the goal of the bill but not the means employed to accomplish it. He 
hesitantly approved the bill but argued that a constitutional amendment was necessary to 
effectively lower the voting age in both state and federal elections because a simple congressional 
statute would crumble under court consideration (Fish, 2012). In an April 1970 letter to leaders in 
the House of Representatives, President Nixon admitted that youth suffrage “by statute is one of 
expediency. It appears easier and quicker [than by constitutional amendment]” (Nixon, 1970). 
Nixon continued in his preference for a constitutional amendment by explaining that first passing 
a statute would delay youth suffrage and provide young Americans with a false sense of hope 
because they would be granted suffrage just for the Supreme Court to revoke it on the grounds of 
constitutionality. This letter was not taken lightly by some representatives who mentioned it or 
entered it into the congressional record on multiple occasions. This was done to further back their 
position which maintained the need of a constitutional amendment for youth suffrage and 
demonstrated that Nixon’s letter did have an influence in the House (Cong. Rec. 116, 14494, 1970). 
Furthermore, Nixon compared this movement to the women’s suffrage movement in an attempt to 
dispel fears that a youth suffrage amendment would fail if sent to the states for ratification (Nixon, 
1970). Nixon was correct and youth suffrage was rejected by the court as a constitutional 
amendment was deemed necessary to lower the voting age in state and local elections (see 
discussion of Oregon v. Mitchell). With little opposition to the concept of lowering the voting age 
to eighteen now, Nixon and proponents of youth suffrage had to do little more to support youth 
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enfranchisement. This was because Congress was now forced by the Supreme Court to pass a 
constitutional amendment to enfranchise eighteen-year-olds, just as Nixon had predicted in his 
1970 letter to House leaders. In concluding this section on the presidents’ support of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment we can turn to a statement made by Glenn Anderson on the House floor: 
“Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy Johnson, and Nixon have endorsed the proposal to extend the 
right to vote to 18-year-olds. The time has come to grant young people full participation in our 
Democratic process” (115 Cong. Rec. 2827, 1969). Representative Anderson’s declaration clearly 
linked the need to finally pass legislation enfranchising America’s youth to the actions of the 
aforementioned presidents; in addition to President Kennedy, who also supported youth 
enfranchisement but made no considerable attempts to accomplish it.  
Congressional Actions 
The next governmental institution that played a role in ratifying the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment is Congress. Social movement pressure and presidential advocation all target the 
Congress as it is the organization that must act for the amendment to be passed. But Congress both 
responds to these pressures and also contains actors that shape the debate, either in pushing for 
ratification or by resisting it. 
The idea of youth suffrage was first introduced in Congress in 1942 by Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg but took nearly three decades for Congress to gain the necessary support to institute 
the change (Johnson, 1968b). During this time, unlike the Nineteenth Amendment, the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment had a single major proponent for ratification within Congress: Senator Jennings 
Randloph from West Virginia. As the “father” of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, Randolph 
consistently supported youth suffrage by way of constitutional amendment (Grossman, 2012). This 
is especially evident in congressional records as Senators like Ted Kennedy commend Senator 
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Randolph’s continued support for youth suffrage over the decades (116 Cong. Rec. 6936, 1970). 
Even when the topic of discussion in Congress was different or focused on a larger related matter, 
Senator Randolph would make arguments supporting youth suffrage (Cong. Rec. 115, 16737, 
1969).  
Examining Senator Randolph’s support for enfranchising America’s youth has raised some 
consistent ideas. Challenges to granting youth suffrage were based largely in tradition and the 
belief that the issue of voting age should be left to the states as opposed to the federal government 
(Cong. Rec. 115, 4638, 1969; Cong. Rec. 115, 4957, 1969). In a  speech to the Senate introducing 
his ninth attempt to lower the voting age, Senator Randolph attempted to offset such arguments 
stating “our young people constitute a well informed and very visible age group” before continuing 
his argument stating that, “for the majority, it [eighteen] signals the end to their formal education. 
They have learned the democratic process through participating in student and extracurricular 
activities” (115 Cong. Rec. 865, 1969). This ideal was repeatedly referenced while justifying youth 
suffrage. Various congressmembers believed that American teens were excited to vote after 
completing their high school civics classes but would be discouraged from participating by the 
time they finally came of age due to these three years of disenfranchisement (115 Cong. Rec. 5692, 
1969). A Republican task force strengthened Randolph’s point: “there is a natural tendency to lose 
interest in politics and government between the time that young people first become aware of the 
political system and the time that they presently become eligible to participate in it” (Cong. Rec. 
115, 22257, 1969). Randolph offered a third justification for youth suffrage that directly referenced 
the popular slogan used amongst social movements at the time, “there is truth in the words, ‘if they 
are old enough to fight they are old enough to vote.’ Young men under arms are carrying out the 
policy of our Nation without the privilege of participating in the determination of that policy” (115 
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Cong. Rec. 866, 1969). This was just the start of Randolph’s speech to Congress as he outlined a 
barrage of reasons to enfranchise those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. These 
rationales included that eighteen-year-olds can drive, sue, purchase guns, be treated as adults by 
the courts, create wills, purchase insurance, produce energetic and new ideals, represent America 
abroad, and participate in activism (115 Cong. Rec. 866, 1969). Randolph’s 1969 introduction of 
his joint resolution for a constitutional amendment also referenced the Republican and Democratic 
platforms of 1968 and their commitment to lowering the voting age (115 Cong. Rec. 866, 1969). 
Senator Randolph did not provide these reasons just once but would repeat similar reasoning 
several more times leading up to the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (Cong. Rec. 116, 
6349, 1970). Almost identical justification for youth suffrage was delivered within the House of 
Representatives also during 1969 by a variety of representatives, many of whom would also 
cosponsor the proposed youth suffrage amendment (115 Cong. Rec. 2826-2829, 1969; Cong. Rec. 
115, 14233, 1969; Cong. Rec. 115, 24952, 1969).  
Another trend in congressmembers’ support of youth suffrage is how they repeatedly 
compared this movement with that of the women’s suffrage movement. The Nineteenth 
Amendment was ratified during the lifetimes of many of the 1960s congressmembers and was used 
to favorably compare female enfranchisement with the current issue of youth suffrage. Statements 
such as Representative Peter Rodino’s, “now I believe most strongly that the same positive results 
achieved by women’s suffrage will accrue from lowering the voting age to 18” (115 Cong. Rec. 
2829, 1969) were common within the House when providing justification for the proposed 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Senators also defended youth suffrage with such comparisons to the 
Nineteenth Amendment. One example of this is Senator Joseph Tydings statement: “the fears 
expressed against extending the vote to persons under twenty-one are just as invalid today as these 
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same arguments were a half century ago when they were used against the universal suffrage” 
(Cong. Rec. 115, 4957, 1969). Fifty years after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
Americans were fully committed and appreciative of the expansion of suffrage to women. 
Congressmembers then strategically used this previous success to promote youth suffrage as they 
understood how similar the two ideas of enfranchisement were.  
Another common trend within both houses of Congress when attempting to garner support 
for youth suffrage was the reading of youth’s letters and accomplishments. Various senators and 
representatives introduced such documents to the rest of Congress to demonstrate the capabilities, 
maturity, and dedication to suffrage amongst America’s youth. Congressmembers often prefaced 
these documents by saying something to emphasize the capabilities of young people in their search 
for suffrage. One such introduction was done by Connecticut’s former representative, 
Representative William Leon St. Onge: “I think the approach of these young people is 
commendable and deserves to be encouraged. They are using the democratic way and process, 
rather than force and violence” (Cong. Rec. 115, 7621, 1969). Representative Onge then went on 
to read a letter from a high school student who was seeking the right to vote to demonstrate his 
intellectual capabilities. In promoting youth suffrage, the introduction of such documents 
composed by young Americans was not uncommon and one tactic employed to garner greater 
support for the suffrage movement (Cong. Rec. 115, 22427, 1969; Cong. Rec. 116, 3449, 1970). 
Other documents were also repeatedly introduced in Congress when justifying lowering the voting 
age. These documents were often taken from newspapers, magazines, or surveys which advocated 
for lowering the voting age using similar justification as mentioned above (Cong. Rec. 115, 11534, 
1969; Cong. Rec. 115, 12982, 1969; Cong. Rec. 115, 19983, 1969). Opinion polls were also 
frequently introduced by congressmembers to show how the public felt about lowering the voting 
WHAT DOES IT TAKE?  68 
 
 
 
age. One such example was reported in July of 1969 by Representative Shirley Chisholm, “opinion 
polls have shown that 64 percent of the American voting public favors lowering the voting age” 
(Cong. Rec. 115, 21301, 1969). Various references to such polls were likely included by 
congressmembers when supporting youth suffrage to demonstrate that constituencies largely 
wanted their delegates to help lower the voting age.     
Amidst the student protests and violence that erupted on college campuses across the 
country during the end of the 1960s, congressmembers theorized youth suffrage as a potential 
solution to the issue. These protests largely criticized the Vietnam war, among other social and 
civil rights issues. Struggling to solve the outbreak of violence, youth suffrage was offered as a 
potential solution to the problem by Senator Philip Hart: “lowering the voting age will not 
eliminate protest by the young. But it will provide them with a direct, constructive, and democratic 
channel for making their views felt” (Cong. Rec. 115, 35923, 1969). These violent protests which 
were plaguing the United States surprisingly played a role in support for youth suffrage. Lowering 
the voting age was one proposed solution for the issue (as was to reform the military draft and 
expanding public service opportunities for young Americans) (Cong. Rec. 115, 41132, 1969). It 
was expected that youth suffrage would allow these students to express their grievances in a more 
productive and democratic way.  
Congressmembers also considered foreign developments when considering joint 
resolutions to lower the voting age. Representative James Howard, a consistent supporter of youth 
suffrage, emphasized to his fellow congressmembers how England had “reduced its voting age 
requirements from 21 to 18 on January 1, 1970” (Cong. Rec. 116, 863, 1970). The Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Latin America were all also mentioned in Congress when 
discussing pioneers of youth suffrage (Cong. Rec. 116, 9907, 1970). These examples were all 
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provided to demonstrate that granting eighteen-year-olds the right to vote was not outrageous and 
instead was being adopted in countries around the world.  
By 1970 a large majority of both the House and Senate supported youth suffrage. The 
question now, as explained by Senator Marlow Cook, was if the federal government could change 
voter qualifications nationwide by a simple statute, “the question of allowing 18-year-olds to vote 
has become not whether but when and how” (Cong. Rec. 116, 6433, 1970). Some congress 
members firmly argued that lowering the voting age by way of statute was constitutional thanks to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court case, Katzenbach v. Morgan, and the opinions of 
major constitutional scholars (Cong. Rec. 116, 6111, 1970). Senator Albert Gore Sr., among 
others, were unsure as to if such a statute would hold under judicial review and favored a 
constitutional amendment but recognized that a statute would be much easier to pass, “if it is 
possible to do it through legislation, constitutionally and effectively, I would favor that, too. 
Perhaps legislation on the subject would facilitate the approval of a constitutional amendment” 
(Cong. Rec. 116, 4469-70, 1970). The statute process to achieve youth suffrage was largely 
favored over the constitutional approach because of the sense of urgency that existed in granting 
youth the right to vote (Cong. Rec. 116, 6651, 1970). This urgency was related to trying to stop 
the student protests plaguing universities across the country. Such urgency led Congress to include 
a youth suffrage amendment in the 1970 Voting Rights Act despite others in the Senate firmly 
believing that youth suffrage can and should be passed independently through a constitutional 
amendment (Cong. Rec. 116, 6118, 1970; Cong. Rec. 116, 6669, 1970). In March the Senate 
finally managed to lower the voting age to 18 through H.R. 4249 which amended the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act to include youth suffrage and extended its duration. The legislation was passed by a 
vote of 64-12 and was immediately followed by the recognition of key senators who promoted 
WHAT DOES IT TAKE?  70 
 
 
 
youth suffrage over the previous decades, including Senator Randolph (Cong. Rec. 116, 7336, 
1970).  
Immediately after the Voting Rights Act of 1970 enfranchised youths, the questions 
surrounding its constitutionality by way of statute were brought up in Congress as editorials 
nationwide questioned the new legislation. One such example of this was Senator Randolph’s 
mentioning of a Washington Post article which stated, “the founding fathers unquestionably 
intended to leave voting age requirements to the states” (Cong. Rec. 116, 7491, 1970). Just days 
after lowering the voting age by statute, members of Congress were aware of the criticisms 
regarding their decision (Cong. Rec. 116, 8804, 1970). This caused legislators to continue 
promoting enfranchisement by way of a constitutional amendment despite lowering the voting age 
by statute just days earlier. “If we now wish to make lowering of the voting age national policy,” 
claimed Senator John Rarick, “we should again follow the Constitution-we should amend it- not 
abrogate it. Otherwise our action is only a dangerous nullity” (Cong. Rec. 116, 8493, 1970). 
Individual senators also continued to question the recently approved statute in the following weeks 
and months. One such example of this was Senator Ervin’s statement: “regardless of the merits 
extending the franchise to younger Americans, this attempt to circumvent the process of 
constitutional amendment is a dangerous affront to our constitutional form of Government” (Cong. 
Rec. 116, 12759, 1970). Some members of the House, such as Roman Hruska, were also hesitant 
to accept the amendments to the voting rights bill that were passed by the Senate largely over 
questions of constitutionality (Cong. Rec. 116, 13734, 1970). Despite eventually passing, this 
problem caused issues for the extension of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as some representatives in 
the House supported its extension but strictly opposed lowering the voting age by way of statute. 
This led Representatives such as Sam Steiger to oppose the bill on the grounds of constitutionality 
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despite supporting extending the Voting Rights Act and granting youth suffrage (Cong. Rec. 116, 
19031, 1970; Cong. Rec. 116, 20166, 1970). Similarly, some congressmembers were not 
supporters of the way the issue of lowering the voting age was handled. Although they supported 
the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 whole heartedly, Representative Emanuel Celler 
for example, argued the two pieces of legislation should have been dealt with separately: “we [the 
House Judiciary Committee] had no hearing on the lowering of the voting age bill, important and 
far reaching as that proposal was. There was no reference of it to a committee, it just came to us 
out of the blue” (Cong. Rec. 116, 31844, 1970). This debate within Congress also contained a third 
position endorsed by members who believed that lowering the voting age should be left to the 
states as opposed to the federal government (Cong. Rec. 116, 19764, 1970). Despite these 
objections the House of Representatives approved the amendments proposed by the Senate and 
agreed to lower the voting age by way of statue. Nixon, despite believing it was unconstitutional, 
then signed the bill into law shortly after Senator Jehnings Randolph sent him a telegram urging 
him to approve the legislation, “I understand your concern and questions over the statutory 
approach to a lower voting age. However, I supported this approach because such a change is so 
necessary and because we have provided for immediate court tests” (Cong. Rec. 116, 20692, 
1970). Nixon’s reception of this telegram may have influenced his readiness to sign the legislation 
as he certainly favored the “immediate court tests” Senator Randolph spoke of to finally get an 
answer as to the constitutionality of their bill. Upon signing the legislation Nixon informed 
Congress that the Attorney General would expedite the court test process so as to settle this issue 
and allow Congress to pass a constitutional amendment depending on the outcome (Cong. Rec. 
116, 20830, 1970).   
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After the Supreme Court rejected the 1970 Voting Rights Act’s lowering of the voting age 
in state and local elections, congressmembers immediately turned to a constitutional amendment 
as the solution. Just a day following the Supreme Court’s decision, Senator Gale McGee explained 
the next step for Congress: “we should move ahead expeditiously to provide, through a 
constitutional amendment to be proposed to the States, for a uniform voting age in all elections in 
all parts of this great Nation” (Cong. Rec. 116, 43268, 1970). A uniform voting age was 
demonstrated as necessary by states because it was predicted that providing separate ballots for 
those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one would be incredibly expensive (Cong. Rec. 
117, 3437, 1971; Cong. Rec. 117, 5491, 1971). During Senate deliberations this expense was 
referenced as to why Congress must move rapidly in passing a constitutional amendment to save 
states money and confusion in the upcoming 1972 election (Cong. Rec. 117, 5516, 1971). While 
many congresspeople immediately turned their attention to a constitutional amendment following 
Oregon v Mitchell, opposition to such legislation persisted amongst some legislators. These 
policymakers cited the recently failed statewide youth suffrage referendums in states such as 
Florida, Michigan, and Connecticut as evidence that youth suffrage proponents were in the 
minority in most states. This reasoning was common amongst youth suffrage opponents, as they 
firmly believed in leaving the issue to the states where, according to the Constitution, it belonged 
(Cong. Rec. 117, 241, 1971).  
Finally, on March 9, 1971 the Senate began their formal consideration of S.J. Res. 7, 
another amendment proposed to lower the voting age. In the opening remarks Senator Bayh again 
outlined the three main reasons for enfranchising eighteen-year-olds, which had been repeated 
time and time again in deliberations over youth suffrage. These primary reasons were that: 
eighteen-year-olds are mature enough to vote; these teens have many of the same responsibilities 
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as adults; and eighteen-year-olds would contribute to society and the political system (Cong. Rec. 
117, 5489, 1971). Now the speed at which youth enfranchisement would be adopted was again of 
paramount importance, but this time amending the constitution was seen as the most expedited 
way to accomplish such change. The other option was to amend each and every states’ individual 
constitution which was not feasible (especially by the time of the 1972 election) (Cong. Rec. 117, 
5818, 1971). The senators then recited previous arguments relating to extending the right to vote 
to eighteen-year-olds and outlined recent state actions in attempting to incorporate youth suffrage. 
After hours of debate on March 10, 1971 the Senate finally voted on the measure in which 94 
senators voted in favor of the bill and six did not vote at all. Following the vote, Senator Quentin 
Burdick thanked Senator Randolph for his decades-long effort to enfranchise American youth 
(Cong. Rec. 117, 5830, 1971).  
With the Senate’s approval of a youth suffrage amendment it was now left to the House for 
approval before being sent to the states for ratification. The Senate’s approval of the measure 
proceeded to put pressure on the House to pass the legislation quickly. Representative James Kee 
of West Virginia explained, “the U.S. Senate has already passed this constitutional amendment 
unanimously. Therefore, we must act swiftly to insure sufficient time to ratify it before the 1972 
elections” (Cong. Rec. 117, 7293, 1971). Following this introduction, the bill was put to the House 
floor where debate ensued. Representatives raised the same reasons, as mentioned above, for and 
against passing the legislation. One new justification in opposition to the amendment came from a 
Representative from Michigan, Edward Hutchinson. Despite supporting the idea of youth suffrage, 
Hutchinson explained he would vote against the proposed amendment because the citizens of 
Michigan had overwhelmingly voted against youth suffrage in a recent referendum (Cong. Rec. 
117, 7535, 1971). With considerable polling having now been completed across the United States 
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as to constituents’ feelings about youth suffrage, representatives had to weigh their personal 
feelings about youth enfranchisement against the desires of their constituents. After about two 
hours of debate and a closing argument against youth enfranchisement on the basis of a slippery 
slope fallacy (a dissenter argued that this relatively small enfranchisement would lead to a chain 
of events and an unfavorable ending), the House voted in favor of the amendment 401-19 with 
twelve representatives not voting. Both houses of Congress had now passed a youth 
enfranchisement amendment and the issue would go to the states where three-fourths of state 
legislators were needed to vote in favor of the proposed Twenty-Sixth Amendment. This took just 
four months to reach the three-fourths minimum and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was added to 
the U.S. Constitution on July 5, 1971. 
The Supreme Court 
The final governmental institution we will look at is that of the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court had an effect on the need for the Twenty-Sixth Amendment with the case of 
Oregon v. Mitchell (1970). This case challenged the 1970 Voting Rights Act which was passed by 
the United States Congress and forced states to lower the voting age in state and local elections to 
eighteen. In Oregon v. Mitchell, a 5-4 ruling granted the legality of this stature’s application to all 
federal elections but found it unconstitutional when applied to state and local elections (Fish, 
2012). Justice Hugo Black explained the court’s decision based largely around Article I, § 2 of the 
Constitution, which granted individual states the power to set voting requirements in local 
elections. As stated in Mr. Black’s opinion, the only restriction on states in setting voting 
requirements comes when matters have “been curtailed by specific constitutional amendments” 
(Oregon v. Mitchell, 1970). Justice Black, and the four other justices who sided with him, 
interpreted the Constitution in a way that did not allow the 1970 Voting Rights Act to enforce 
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requirements on state and local elections. Had this decision not been effectively erased by the 
subsequent Twenty-Sixth Amendment, states like Oregon, who objected to lowering the voting 
age, would’ve had to provide specific federal election ballots to those between the age of eighteen 
and twenty-one. Such ballots were understood to be complicated and expensive for localities to 
administer, which was then used as an argument in support of passing a constitutional amendment 
to lower the voting age (Cong. Rec. 117, 2255, 1971; Cong. Rec. 117, 3437, 1971). 
Oregon v. Mitchell was highly divisive amongst the Supreme Court justices. The 1970 
Voting Rights Act contained additional legislation including laws to end voting discrimination on 
the basis of race in elections; but youth suffrage was the cause of practically all the disagreement 
amongst the justices. One dissenting opinion came from Justice John Harlan, who believed that 
Congress could not constitutionally interfere with voting requirements in state, local, and even 
federal elections. Referencing the Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, 
Harlan argued that they were “forceful evidence of the common understanding in 1869, 1919, and 
1962, respectively, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to legislate in these 
respects” (Oregon v. Mitchell, 1970). Harlan referenced the previous participatory amendments in 
his decision to show how Congress had historically understood that they lacked the unilateral 
power to enfranchise large groups of people without the amendment process. Other justices 
disagreed with the final decision of the court for different reasons. Justice William Douglas, for 
example, believed that Congress unilaterally held the power to lower the voting age in local, state, 
and federal elections. Douglas’s opinion noted that “since the right [to vote] is civil and not 
"political," it is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which in 
turn, by § 5 of that Amendment, can be "enforced" by Congress” (Oregon v. Mitchell, 1970). 
Continuing with this form of logic, Douglas insisted that lowering the voting age must fall under 
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the interest of equal protection because youth disenfranchisement is unfair considering the 
“national defense responsibilities imposed on them” (Oregon v. Mitchell, 1970). Clearly referring 
to eighteen-year-olds being drafted into the military, Justice Douglas insisted that having a voice 
in the government that was drafting them is only fair under the equal protection clause. Despite 
the three primary differing opinions as to the constitutionality of youth suffrage in the 1970 Voting 
Rights Act, Justice Black’s opinion was held as the decision of the court. This ruling then forced 
Congress to pursue a constitutional amendment if it wished to enfranchise eighteen-year-olds in 
all local, state, and federal elections. Congressmembers then saw the need for a constitutional 
amendment: “the constitutional amendment,” noted Representative James Kee, “is made necessary 
by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States… To have a dual system of voting is 
not only confusing, but misleading” (Cong. Rec. 117, 7293, 1971). Thus, we can conclude that the 
Supreme Court operated in accordance with Rosenberg’s “constrained court” view in this case just 
as it had regarding the Nineteenth Amendment. The Court recognized an issue with the 1970 
Voting Rights Act and could only deem it unconstitutional. The Court lacked the power to make 
any meaningful change based upon this and instead had to rely upon Congress to pass legislation 
that would address the issue.     
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 So, what informal factors are conducive to the ratification of a participatory amendment? 
This thesis has now thoroughly examined informal factors including social movements, the 
Supreme Court, congressional actions, and presidential support as they relate to the Nineteenth 
and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. Through examination of congressional records, newspapers, 
speeches, and other primary documents we now have an understanding as to how these informal 
factors affected each of the amendments and their ratification processes. This conclusion section 
will now interpret what we have learned and compare these two participatory amendments to gain 
a better understanding as to which informal factors were especially conducive to these 
amendments.  
 In our analysis of the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments a few trends have 
appeared. In both cases, demands for enfranchisement from these subjugated groups persisted long 
before their respected amendments were ratified. Congressional records also demonstrated that 
there was a sense of urgency in attempting to ratify these amendments to end radical protests. 
Additionally, both amendments were vigorously sought by their respective social movements 
which employed nonradical lobbying efforts through grassroot mobilization at the state and federal 
levels. Finally, the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments were also both ratified at the tail 
end of two major wars in which the disenfranchised groups took on additional responsibilities both 
at home and abroad. These trends may help us identify favorable conditions for the ratification of 
future participatory amendments.  
 To begin, in the ratification process of both the Twenty-Sixth and Nineteenth Amendments 
we find a sense of urgency amongst pro-suffrage legislators in seeking ratification to stop radical 
protests. In the case of the Nineteenth Amendment, the principal social movement, the National 
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American Woman Suffrage Association, was firmly against radical protests including picketing 
and large-scale marches. Although neither of these forms of protest may be considered “radical” 
to us today, during the early twentieth century such organizing was unprecedented, especially 
amongst women. So, in 1913 when Lucy Burns and Alice Paul staged a large march on Washington 
on behalf of the NAWSA, it is unsurprising that it gained a considerable amount of media attention 
as scores of women were hurt or arrested. By vowing to not participate in such marches again, the 
NAWSA denounced this form of radical change. Radical protests were demonstrated within both 
movements for the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to be harmful because they would 
legitimize negative “external responses to the insurgents” (McAdams, 1982). To ensure the 
success of their respective social movements, activists decided to avoid these avenues of change 
and instead focused on lobbying legislators while also disseminating information to the public to 
“cognitively liberate” citizens and commit them to change. Regarding the Nineteenth Amendment, 
this was recognized by legislators who complimented the “‘ladylike’ actions” of the NAWSA and 
were far more responsive to their conservative methods of change as opposed to the radical 
attempts of the NWP (Cong. Rec. 56, 10843, 1918). Similarly, leading up to the passage of the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment there was a sense of desperation amongst legislators to pass the 
legislation to stop the violent student protests of the late 1960s. These student protests largely 
objected to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Although it was understood that ratifying a youth 
enfranchisement amendment would not end these protests completely, it was expected that it 
would certainly go a long way in helping. Senator Philip Hart made this connection explicitly 
arguing that enfranchising youth would provide a “direct, constructive, and democrat channel for 
making their views felt” (Cong. Rec. 115, 35923, 1969). Legislators began to realize that youth 
enfranchisement would help with these radical protests and, out of a sense of urgency, enfranchised 
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eighteen-year olds in the 1970 Voting Rights Act, despite widespread and justified criticisms that 
enfranchisement via a statute was unconstitutional. Following Oregon v Mitchell (1970) the need 
for a youth enfranchisement amendment was understood and rapidly passed through both houses 
of Congress and ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures within seven months. Although this 
rapid passage is also linked to the need for uniform voting qualifications by the 1972 election, 
stopping the radical protests plaguing college campuses was what drove the urgency to enfranchise 
youths in 1970. These two participatory amendments thus demonstrate Congress’s willingness to 
negotiate with conservative disenfranchised organizations to try and end radical protests. 
 An additional commonality that appeared from this case study is how both participatory 
amendments were sought by large grassroot organizations that attempted to distance themselves 
from the radical protesters of the previous paragraph. Regarding the Nineteenth Amendment, the 
AWSA and NWSA were integral precursors to the eventual formation, and success, of the 
NAWSA in 1890. These groups provided essential resources to the NAWSA when it was formed 
and helped the group quickly become nationally renowned. McAdam’s (1982) Political Process 
Model took this into account with the “indigenous organization strength” factor. The social 
movements in favor of both amendments covered here unsurprisingly relied heavily on indigenous 
organizations, especially when first starting. The NAWSA was also able to successfully take 
advantage of the expanding “political opportunities” (McAdams, 1982) caused by World War I 
and leverage their organizational strength with about two million members. This strength gave the 
NAWSA the ability to meet privately with President Wilson on multiple occasions, speak before 
both houses of Congress, and have their ideas and progress repeatedly cited in congressional 
hearings. By advocating change directly to legislators in state governments, and importantly the 
federal government, the NAWSA was able to apply considerable pressure on legislators to take 
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their cause seriously and enfranchise women. The Youth Franchise Coalition similarly petitioned 
for change through traditional mediums and grassroot mobilization. The YFC, like the NAWSA, 
also had considerable “indigenous organizational strength” as it was formed from a unification of 
numerous youth associations and took advantage of expanding “political opportunities” provided 
by the Vietnam War (McAdams, 1982). The YFC compiled information relating to support for 
youth enfranchisement, spoke before both houses of Congress, and was favorably referenced in 
the congressional records for working with legislators (Cong. Rec. 115, 23523, 1969). Both the 
NAWSA and Youth Franchise Coalition were massive social movements demanding the 
enfranchisement of their respective factions. They both employed nonradical lobbying measures 
through traditional mediums to pressure legislators into ratifying participatory amendments. It is 
also worth noting that both the NAWSA and YFC attempted to achieve change on the state level 
prior to petitioning for a federal amendment. By focusing on the state level first, both groups 
experienced some success in achieving suffrage in various isolated states. These states were 
important for the organizations as they proved to be “testing grounds” for the new form of 
enfranchisement and were able to demonstrate the potential successes of expanding the electorate 
in the rest of the country. Both movements attempted to achieve federal enfranchisement and failed 
prior to the eventual ratification of the amendments which demonstrates that the social movements 
require some time to establish themselves and perfect strategies to petition federal legislators.  
 The Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments were also both ratified at the end of two 
major wars, WWI and the Vietnam War respectively. These two major wars provided social 
movements with the necessary “political opportunities” to petition for change. The wars opened 
up additional roles for women and eighteen-year olds both at home and abroad. By skillfully taking 
on these roles, the subjugated individuals proved that they were contributing members of the 
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country and should be awarded the right to vote. Given McAdam’s (1982) Political Process Model, 
the role of these major wars certainly contributed to the formation and success of the social 
movements in both cases. The gravity in which these wars affected the ratification of both 
participatory amendments is clearly evident in social movement strategies and congressional 
records. The NAWSA for example created the “war service department” to aid the American war 
efforts. By creating this department, the NAWSA was stressing their patriotism and ability to be 
contributing citizens which proved integral to their eventual success as congressmembers 
repeatedly referenced the NAWSA’s, and more broadly women’s, considerable contributions to 
the war effort. Similarly, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified in the midst of the Vietnam 
War in which young men were being sent to war at an unprecedented rate because of the military 
draft. Presidential speeches and congressional debates demonstrate support for enfranchising 
young Americans because of their service in the Vietnam War as the slogan, “old enough to fight, 
old enough to vote,” consistently linked enfranchisement with youth’s service in the military 
(Cong. Rec 115, 22257, 1969). In the case of both the participatory amendments examined here, 
the wars acted as essential catalysts for their eventual ratification. The importance of “political 
opportunities” to social movements and their success is clearly in operation here as WWI and the 
Vietnam War were essential to the arguments and eventual adoption of these participatory 
amendments. Through increased participation in the wars, women and young people were able to 
demonstrate their dedication to America which warranted their right to vote. Although a major war 
may not be necessary for the ratification of a participatory amendment, it is certainly conducive, 
especially when the disenfranchised group take on a larger role in society because of war needs. 
 It is also worth noting that both the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments had 
substantial support from U.S. presidents leading up to their ratification. President Wilson, in the 
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case of the Nineteenth Amendment, avidly supported female suffrage by way of a constitutional 
amendment later in his tenure. By meeting with members of the NAWSA, publicly supporting 
female suffrage in speeches, and writing personal appeals to legislators, President Wilson affected 
the opinions of many influential people to help them become more sympathetic to the movement. 
This surprisingly went to the extent that individual legislators advocated for female suffrage on 
the basis of “standing by” the president no matter what during the war (Cong. Rec. 56, 764, 1918b). 
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment received similar presidential support, although more diluted 
because Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon all supported lowering the voting age. 
Through state of the union addresses, public speeches, and letters/addresses to Congress these 
three presidents all supported youth suffrage which helped draw attention to the issue. Presidential 
support for these participatory amendments proved to be substantial and were repeatedly 
referenced in congressional debates over the participatory amendments. This allows us to conclude 
that when presidents decided to “go public” (Kernell, 1993) in support of these participatory 
amendments they were able to rally support for the cause. It is also important to acknowledge that 
all four of the aforementioned presidents only began to support their respective enfranchisement 
measures once well-established movements were in place. This supports Bodnick (1990) and 
Edwards III and Wood’s (1999) theory that presidents react to the public and media when 
supporting legislation. Although presidents are not spearheading these suffrage initiatives, getting 
them on board with the enfranchisement movement proved to be especially beneficial in attempts 
to achieve the right to vote.    
 With this we have a greater understanding as to what informal factors are conducive to the 
ratification a participatory amendment. All of the aforementioned factors certainly played a role 
in the ratification of the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments and can be applied 
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conservatively to generalize what is needed for potential future participatory amendments. The 
social movements in both cases seemed to play one of the largest roles in ratification because of 
their ability to harness grassroot mobilization and petition legislators both on the state and federal 
levels. A well-established and conservative social movement seems to be almost necessary to pass 
a participatory amendment because of their ability to pressure legislators without inciting 
considerable counter-movements that radical protests repeatedly caused. The expansion of 
political opportunities also played a considerable role in ratification because suffrage was of 
especial importance during the tremulous times of war due to social movements effectively linking 
the two. WWI and the Vietnam War both allowed disenfranchised groups to play a greater role in 
the United States which was favorably observed by the American public and legislators. Although 
a war may not necessarily be required for future participatory amendments, disenfranchised groups 
do need to demonstrate their value to the United States for legislators to think that they deserve 
the right to vote. Additionally, people attempting to organize and pressure the government for 
future participatory amendments should avoid radical means of protest as congressmembers 
seemed to uniformly denounce such attempts to inspire change. There was an urgency to 
enfranchise both groups of Americans amongst legislators to stop radical protests, but when it 
came down to it, legislators favored working with conservative social movements while altogether 
avoiding radical activists. Lastly, examination of these amendments suggests that gaining 
presidential support should be a prerogative of social movements as the sitting president can hold 
considerable sway over legislators’ decisions and public opinion through various sorts of appeals. 
Understanding these favorable conditions could be used by future advocates for the 
enfranchisement of groups such as the mentally ill, youths below the age of eighteen, prisoners, 
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residents of U.S. territories, and those not given the right to vote after serving specific prison 
sentences.  
 In addition to the informal factors examined in this thesis, future scholarship should 
examine the ways in which the mass media affects the ratification of participatory amendments. 
Although outside the scope of this study, the news media is prevalent in our country, so it is not 
surprising that coverage presented by news outlets affect lawmakers, especially when focused on 
constituents’ legislative demands. Studies of this phenomenon have consistently found that the 
media does affect the agenda of policy makers both on the state level and on the national level 
(Tan & Weaver, 2009).  The extent that the policy agenda is affected by the media does differ 
depending on the issue at hand and the amount of coverage the topic receives. Certain political 
issues, such as domestic ones, have been found to affect policymakers’ agendas and opinions to a 
greater extent than others (Soroka, 2002). The media both sets the public agenda (Shaw, 1979) and 
frames how the public thinks about an issue using different “media frames” (Goffman, 1974). 
These “frames” in the context of the mass media refer to how media outlets can portray information 
in different ways as to promote one interpretation of the information and curb others. The biggest 
issue with studying the extent that the media affected policymakers is the issue of causality due to 
lawmakers’ inherent salience in American society. The interaction between the media and political 
actors goes in both directions as each affects the other (Wolfe, 2012; Wolfe, Jones, & Baumgartner, 
2013). This is problematic but the media is a very powerful institution in our country and provides 
the average American with updates regarding political initiatives. This makes an examination of 
how large of an impact, if at all, it has on a participatory amendment’s chances of being ratified 
important to better understand the informal factors related to their ratification.  
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 The case study completed in this thesis has provided us with an in-depth analysis of the 
informal factors related to the passage of the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. One 
weakness of this approach in answering which informal factors affect participatory amendments 
more broadly is that we have only completed an in-depth analysis of two of the five participatory 
amendments. To get a broader understanding of participatory amendments, an in-depth analysis of 
the Fifteenth, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments’ relationship to these informal 
factors is required. Additionally, examining congressional records has demonstrated what factors 
were especially prevalent in debates regarding these participatory amendments but the true scope 
that each informal factor affected ratification is impossible to quantify. This is largely the case 
because all these informal factors affect one another at the same time they are affecting the chances 
of ratification, which makes pinpointing causality difficult. Although this thesis was conducted 
thoroughly with academic rigor, we cannot truly generalize to all participatory amendments 
without examining additional informal factors (i.e. the media) and the remaining participatory 
amendments.    
 To conclude, this thesis has examined how social movements, presidents, the Supreme 
Court, and congressional actors affected the ratification process of the Nineteenth and Twenty-
Sixth Amendments. Social movements have been found to generate considerable grassroot 
mobilization to pressure for participatory amendments, especially when they do so through 
conservative approaches. Movements for participatory amendments in the cases here also proved 
especially effective, on state and the federal level, during and immediately after major wars in 
which the disenfranchised party took on expanded and important roles in American society. It was 
difficult to make sweeping generalizations about the Supreme Court in this study because it played 
a very different role in both the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. Despite this we see 
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clear evidence supporting Rosenberg’s (2008) “constrained court” ideal because the Supreme 
Court failed to effectively produce social reform and instead relied on other institutions. Although 
not conclusive, the information gathered here sheds additional light on the process of ratifying 
participatory amendments, especially the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth.    
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